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FOREWORD 
Basic technological systems such as the world energy system have come to join na-
ture itself in forming the buttresses of man's activities. The interdependence this has led 
to in the contemporary world is nowhere better illustrated than it is by the evolution of 
the world energy system over the past ten years. 
Countries that meet their energy needs largely through imports are particularly 
aware of this new kind of dependence. Clearly, the means for securing a sufficient measure 
of independence have to be found within such countries or within groups of such countries. 
However, an analysis of the problems that arise on the national level calls for an interna-
tional perspective, which must also be long term to take account of the inertia of basic 
technological systems. 
IIASA's Energy Systems Program Group set out to gain just such a perspective in its 
global energy study. The Institute sought to quantify the possibilities for providing enough 
energy for a rapidly growing world population obligated to promote economic develop-
ment worldwide while using its energy resources wisely. 
The narrow technological paths a cooperative world can take in order to achieve this 
goal have been pointed out in Energy in A Finite World (1981), the comprehensive report 
of the study by IIASA's Energy Systems Program Group. As well as the energy problem, 
Energy in a Finite World touches upon other truly global features, such as the effects of 
energy production and consumption on the climate and the environment, and the impacts 
of potential breakthroughs in science and technology. This information must eventually 
be input to institutionalized decision making — nonexistent at the global level — before it 
can actually be turned to use. 
An opportunity to test the applicability of the global study arose with the Energy 
Systems Program Group's cooperation with the services of the European Communities in 
investigating the energy problem emerging in the EC countries and the R&D strategies they 
are seeking to develop in response. The three-year study, supported by two contracts from 
the Directorate General for Research, Science, and Education of the Commission of the 
European Communities, highlighted the complexities of international interdependence. It 
is documented in this report. 
The report identifies some of the conflicts and differences that may arise between 
regional outlooks and a global perspective; between the balancing of demand and supply 
in a cooperating world, and the furthering of the objectives of a group of countries such as 
the EC in a competitive world. Some possibilities were explored of how to resolve these 
conflicts by way of alternative energy R&D strategies. These strategies were formulated 
as energy scenarios for the EC. 
In the course of this study a gradual shift in focus occurred, as has happened with 
other truly novel analyses. The uncertainty about the directions of general economic 
development of the EC countries was found to match the uncertainty about the availabil-
ity of reasonably priced energy on future world markets. The study prompted, but left 
iv Foreword 
open, the crucial question of the extent to which a forward strategy of enlarging the 
indigenous supply potential should help decouple the general economic development of 
the European Communities from the worsening international energy outlook. 
WOLFGANG SASSIN 
Acting Leader 
Energy Systems Program 
CONTENTS 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1 
ABSTRACT 11 
INTRODUCTION 11 
GLOBAL ENERGY PERSPECTIVES AND THE EC OUTLOOK 14 
2.1 The Methodological Approach 14 
2.2 The Potential Evolution of Industrialized Countries with Scarce 
Energy Resources in the IIASA Global Scenarios 20 
2.3 The Long-Term EC Energy Scenarios 26 
A COMPARISON OF THE GLOBAL AND THE EC SCENARIOS 29 
3.1 The EC as a Subregion of the Global Energy System 30 
3.2 Discrepancies between the Global and the EC Perspectives 52 
THE ADAPTED SCENARIO SET FOR THE EC 55 
4.1 The Economic Productivity Approach versus the Energy 
Demand Approach 56 
4.2 Macroeconomic Perspectives 58 
4.3 A Consistent Energy Demand Structure 64 
4.4 Supply Flexibility : Coal versus Nuclear Energy 72 
ASSESSMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS 78 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 81 
REFERENCES 81 
APPENDK: The MESSAGE Model 83 

Research Report RR-83-9, March 1983 
FUELING EUROPE IN THE FUTURE 
The Long-Term Energy Problem in the EC Countries: 
Alternative R&D Strategies 
W. Sassin, A. Hölzl, H.-H. Rogner, and L. Schrattenholzer 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Austria 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Europe's present energy problem stems in the short term from relatively recent 
changes in oil prices on the world market. The European Community countries currently 
rely on oil, 80% of it imported, for around half of their entire energy needs. The extent 
of Europe's dependence on imported oil and its vulnerability to supply disruptions were 
sharply illustrated by the 1973 oil crisis and the fourfold price rises that followed. The 
energy problem of the coming decades will be much more than a matter of adjusting to 
higher prices, however: within thirty years the world's known reserves of conventional oil 
could be approaching exhaustion. The EC countries, poor in energy resources, must 
adjust their economies to a world energy system characterized by worldwide resource 
flows and increasing international interdependence. Since lead-times for the introduction 
of new energy technologies may range from thirty to fifty years, a detailed analysis of 
potential long-term global developments is needed to design R&D strategies for the EC 
countries that are consistent with the resource and technological constraints. 
In 1979 the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis entered into a 
contract with the Directorate General for Research, Science; and Education of the 
Commission of the European Communities to investigate the long-term energy problem 
emerging in the EC countries and the national research and development strategies they 
are seeking to develop in response. IIASA had recently concluded the first ever globally 
comprehensive study of the long-term world energy problem, in which researchers of the 
Institute's Energy Systems Program divided the world into seven regions of broadly 
similar economic and energy characteristics, and analyzed in detail their prospects for the 
fifty years to 2030, a period during which the world's population is expected to rise to 
eight billion. The study findings were guardedly optimistic — that the potential of known 
resources and technologies in hand or almost at hand will be sufficient to fuel a more 
prosperous world in 2030 that supports a population double that of 1975. Furthermore, 
by 2030 the world could be at the threshold of the critical and ultimately essential 
transition from an energy system based on depletable fossil fuels (coal, oil, and gas) to 
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one based on nondepletable sustainable resources (solar energy, advanced nuclear reac-
tors, renewables, etc.). (The detailed results are presented in Energy in a Finite World, the 
two-volume report of the global study published in 1981 by Ballinger, and in an Executive 
Summary of the same title.) 
In addition to the global study, the present investigation used an earlier study of 
the EC's long-term energy problem as a point of departure: in 1980 the EC published the 
final report of its own technical study, made by a working group from the EC, the 
International Energy Agency, and IIASA. (Commission of the European Communities 
(1980) Crucial Choices for the Energy Transition.) The study, which explored a range of 
conservation and supply options using trend extrapolations of demographic, economic, 
and technological parameters, was instructive, but had critical shortcomings: it did not 
take due account of the interdependence between energy prices, energy demand, and the 
rate of supply, and it neglected feedback effects on the EC countries caused by the re-
sponses of other world regions to the global energy problem. 
IIASA's present investigation therefore represents an attempt to establish how the 
European energy system could be adapted by technological change to an optimistic 
assessment of future global conditions. The study explores the interaction between the 
energy system and the economy, adhering as closely as possible to a macroeconomic 
optimization principle that ties the economic value of energy to anticipated productivity 
levels of capital and labor. 
The Approach to the Analysis and the Assumptions Made 
The approach followed in the IIASA/EC study, as in IIASA's global study and in the 
EC's own Crucial Choices study, was one of scenario writing. Developing a scenario is 
neither to predict what will happen in the future nor to prescribe what should happen: it 
is simply a means of organizing the information available into comprehensive and intern-
ally consistent synopses of the possible course of events. The study concentrated on the 
physical and economic aspects of the energy problem, and the methods used were those 
of engineering and economics. Limiting the analysis and methods in this way necessarily 
mean incorporating the following implicit assumptions: 
— The future will be for the most part "business as usual". There will be no catas-
trophic wars; nor shall the energy problem be solved by technological panaceas. 
— The world will be blessed with a high degree of international cooperation. Thus 
the results indicate what can be done with the world's endowment of energy 
resources, manpower, capital, and knowhow. In particular, the study assumes 
that there will be a functioning world trade in coal, oil, and gas, allowing re-
sources to flow from the resource-rich to the resource-poor countries, and that 
there will be no new cartels to fix energy price levels substantially above the 
cost price levels used for all nonoil trade in the scenarios. Developments since 
1975 indicate that this is over-optimistic, as countries have come to limit their 
oil and gas production in view of their own long-term national needs, and other 
energy prices have closely followed oil prices. 
— Those social and political dimensions of the energy problem not explicitly 
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included in the analysis will not severely curtail the development of energy sup-
plies during the next fifty years. The constraints taken into account in the study 
were physical (such as the heating values of different coal deposits), technical 
(such as the efficiency, of electricity plants), and structural (such as the limita-
tions on the rate at which one energy source can be substituted for another). It 
must always be borne in mind when drawing conclusions from the results that 
social and political constraints, for example on nuclear energy growth, have 
been deliberately disregarded in this analysis. 
— Inflationary effects are negligible. The analysis of the competitive economics is 
carried out in terms of constant US 1975 dollars; thus monetary aspects of the 
energy problem, particularly those associated with eroding creditworthiness, 
are not taken into account. 
To this list should be added the following two assumptions, which explicitly underlie 
the data used in the scenarios. 
— A vigorous exploration for new energy resources in Europe is assumed. 
— Economic growth rates are assumed to be moderate and to decline steadily over 
time, though remaining positive. 
By taking into account the quantitative findings of the global scenarios, translated 
to the regional level of the EC, with these assumptions, IIASA developed a set of macro-
economically consistent energy supply scenarios for the EC countries based on the opti-
mal allocation of capital, labor, and energy. 
The Method of the Analysis and the Findings 
Adaptations to the rising energy prices of the past decade are sometimes termed 
conservation, sometimes efficiency improvements, and sometimes productivity increases. 
Each of these involves reducing the amount of energy needed to perform some service by 
replacing it with something else. In some cases energy can effectively be replaced by capital 
(e.g. by investing in home insulation); in others by labor (e.g. in tuning an engine to reduce 
its fuel consumption); in still others it may be saved simply by ingenuity or knowhow (e.g. 
by designing more efficient jet engines or new processes in steelmaking, or even just by 
making more carefully planned shopping trips). Thus rearrangements of resources of 
capital, labor, and knowhow can conserve energy, and appropriate investment of these 
resources — in education, research and development, capital equipment, exploratory dril-
ling — can increase the stock of resources that can be put to use. 
Where the present IIASA analysis differs from previous studies of the EC's energy 
options is in treating energy as a factor of production, just as capital and labor. The 
underlying idea in the IIASA/EC scenarios was to postulate equilibrium conditions for 
the substitution of capital and labor for energy : that is, to arrive at the optimal allocation 
of the three resources. If the marginal productivity of capital and labor is high, then it is 
costly to substitute either of these for energy. This point has important implications, 
since previously proposed technically oriented energy strategies for the EC countries were 
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found to imply a degree of energy conservation and substitution away from oil that does 
not appear economically justified at the oil price levels characteristic of global supply 
opportunities. 
The IIASA/EC study found previous investigations of the European energy future 
to be over­optimistic with regard to economic growth, as well as energy import oppor­
tunities and conservation potential. In the new IIASA/EC scenarios a substantially lower 
rate of economic growth is projected. 
IIASA High Scenario 
(36 terawatt­years per year globally) 
IIASA Low Scenario 
(22 terawatt­years per year globally) 
/ Coal (High) 
/ 
Energy imports of IIASA Region III (Western Europe and Japan) in the two scenarios of the IIASA 
global energy study Energy in a Finite World. The reduced dependence on oil imports in the high 
scenario is replaced by an increased dependence on coal and natural gas imports. In the low economic 
growth scenario oil imports grow more slowly, but the dependence on oil imports extends well into 
the next century with no possibility of building alternative fossil systems quickly. 
The study used computer models to simulate energy demand and supply, to balance 
the two over the five decades of the study period, and to examine the long­term macro­
economic implications of alternative energy supply scenarios. Future energy demand was 
projected by extrapolating demographic, economic, and technical parameters. This 
involved making assumptions about the economic growth rates of the various sectors 
of the EC economy, broken down in the study into the production of goods, freight 
transportation, passenger transportation, households, and the service sector, and then 
further subdivided. Projections of energy efficiencies, growth rates, shifts between sectors, 
and energy­related details of lifestyles were then made : extent and means of travel, heating 
requirements, and so on. 
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The next step in the common methodology for both the IIASA global study and 
the Crucial Choices study was to explore the possibilities for providing the required 
amount of final energy using available resources and technologies, the central objective 
being to minimize the overall cost of the primary energy forms (e.g. coal, oil, gas, uranium). 
The IIASA global study found a transition in the allocation of energy exports from 
the resource-rich developing countries in Latin America, northern Africa, and the Middle 
East at about the turn of the century. The rest of the developing world (most of Africa 
and southern and south-east Asia) switches from being a net exporter of energy to being a 
net importer. North America, whose oñ imports are assumed to decline to zero by this 
time, is thus replaced by the developing countries in competition for oil with the European 
countries and Japan. Over the next few decades, the global scenarios envisage a shift away 
from the present high imports of oil into Western Europe from the OPEC countries to 
high imports of gas and later coal from the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and North 
America. 
One formidable problem in the EC countries will be the provision of liquid fuels 
for transportation and chemical feedstocks; crude-oil-based products alone will be insuf-
ficient to meet the projected demand. For this reason coal liquefaction to produce 
synthetic fuels was included in the study, on a world scale from the year 2000. Renewable 
resources, as a result of the long lead-times involved, make a relatively small, but none-
theless important, contribution by 2030. 
For the next half century, fossil fuels will continue to dominate the world's energy 
supply. Global consumption of both gas and oil will actually continue to increase over the 
next fifty years. The two resources will become progressively costlier to produce, how-
ever, as deep off-shore deposits of oil and deep gas formations are exploited. Furthermore, 
gas and oil will need to be complemented with "dirtier" hydrocarbons such as oil shales 
and tar sands that are also less accessible and more expensive to extract. 
The macroeconomic growth model MACRO was used to cross-check the impact of 
each energy supply strategy on the economic environment in the EC. The macroeconomic 
demand and supply of capital, labor, and energy as a third factor of production were 
balanced and the level of economic growth determined. This cross-check revealed serious 
inconsistencies in the Crucial Choices scenarios between the evolution of energy demand 
and the equilibrium energy cost. That is, the energy conservation effects assumed in the 
study are inconsistent with the energy cost level calculated to correspond to the expansion 
in demand. 
These energy cost/energy utility considerations lead to the central question of the 
extent to which the energy problem might obstruct an otherwise feasible economic evolu-
tion in the EC, and the corollary question of whether the energy sector should be isolated 
from the rest of the economy and stabilized through transfer payments. There are clearly 
conflicting objectives involved in restructuring the energy system while coping at the 
same time with soaring import costs and declining general economic growth. 
A modification to the scenario writing procedure was introduced to produce two 
new IIASA/EC scenarios. In the new approach, labor productivity and labor force partic-
ipation rates are determined exogenously and serve as inputs to the models, which then 
calculate economic growth projections internally by clearing markets for capital, labor, 
and energy. In this way a macroeconomically consistent demand scenario was developed 
and used to investigate the trade-off between increased domestic investment and increased 
energy imports. 
W. Sassin, Α. Hölzl, Η.­Η. Rogner, L. Schrattenholzer 
3000 ­
2500 
2000 
1500 
1000 
500 
Q. *-> C 
ra 
> 
cr ¡υ 
o 
M ­
(Λ 
O 
o 
o ­
2000 2010 
Year 
2030 
The EC Acceptable Dependence energy supply case from the Crucial Choices study: primary energy 
inputs calculated in 1980 for the European Communities on the basis of optimistic assumptions about 
economic performance, technological advance, and extended energy trade. HTR, high temperature 
reactor; FBR, fast breeder reactor; LWR, light water reactor. This reference scenario balances the roles 
of fossil fuels and nuclear energy and rests on a rather strong energy conservation trend. 
8000 + 
o 
T3 . Λ f»» (33 τ— 
C/5 
Ζ) 
c ,0 
Έ 
η 
Q 
α 
6000 
4000 
2000 
Reference 
case 
Macroeconomically 
balanced case 
1980 1990 
— ι 
2000 
Year 
2010 2020 2030 
Evolution of the net GDP of the EC countries in the 1980 reference case and the newly designed 
balanced macroeconomic growth case for the EC. For this latter case a "nuclear" and a "coal" version 
were compared. 
Two alternative future energy supply paths were then analyzed to define the range 
of technological choices open to the EC countries in a medium- to long-term future of 
low economic growth. One is characterized by the assumption of favorable capital costs 
for nuclear energy (the Nuclear Scenario); the second has rather higher costs for nuclear 
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energy, thus favoring coal technologies (the Coal Scenario). The GDP growth rates in the 
two scenarios are almost identical, declining from an average of 2.2% per year (1985—2000) 
to 1.1% (2015—2030), but resources are found to be allocated quite differently. Energy 
import costs roughly double between 1980 and 2030, with a dependence of about 28% 
on imports in the Nuclear Scenario. The figure in the Coal Scenario is about 39%. 
In the Nuclear Scenario coal consumption drops off substantially by 2000—2010. 
Coal in effect fills the electricity generating gap until there is sufficient nuclear capacity 
available to meet demand. In the long term the role of coal is as a raw material for lique­
faction to produce synfuels. In the Coal Scenario coal production was increased to permit 
a more limited introduction of nuclear power, and in particular to delay the deployment 
of advanced nuclear reactors. The introduction of advanced nuclear reactors is thus delayed 
beyond 2030. The consumption of uranium is actually higher in the Coal Scenario owing 
to the later introduction of advanced reactors and the consequent greater utilization of 
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light water reactors. In fact, the world's uranium resources, which are in energy terms the 
rough equivalent of global oil reserves, are almost exhausted in the Coal Scenario, raising 
the possibility of future energy crises arising from uranium shortages. 
In both cases the energy sector charges against the rest of the economy. In the 
Nuclear Scenario the economy is more capital intensive owing to the build­up of an ad­
vanced nuclear infrastructure. Reactors consuming enriched uranium are projected to be 
replaced with advanced reactors well within the fifty­year study period. The fact that the 
earth's resources of uranium are almost exhausted in this scenario emphasizes the impor­
tance of high temperature reactors, which can also use thorium as an energy source. 
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The different effects on the energy import dependence and the trade balance in the macroeconomically 
balanced Coal and Nuclear Scenarios. 
The two responses, the Coal Scenario and the Nuclear Scenario, impede economic 
growth fairly equally on the basis of the costs assumed. It makes little difference whether 
the same amount of energy is provided from indigenous sources or by increasing imports 
and running trade deficits. 
An assessment of the two scenarios in terms of two tentative EC policy goals of 
limiting import dependence and the dependence on any single primary energy source 
shows that in 2030 coal provides 35% of primary energy supplied in the Coal Scenario 
and nuclear energy 34% of primary energy in the Nuclear Scenario. This indicates the im­
portance of advanced reactors in replacing energy imports if energy self­sufficiency be­
comes a primary goal. 
The two scenarios thus chart the extremes between which the path of future energy 
development can be chosen. The fact that this fairly narrow choice is based on an optimis­
tic view of the availability of primary energy, assuming free market access to world 
energy resources and consistent world energy trade, highlights the technological flexibility 
the EC countries must develop to be able to respond to changes on international energy 
Fueling Europe in the Future 9 
markets. The choice of emphasis between coal and nuclear energy is a critical one, requiring 
decisions and adjustments well in advance of implementation. There are other alternatives 
that must be kept in view, such as the liquefaction of natural gas and its transport over 
large distances. Still further options, such as nuclear fusion and centralized solar energy, are 
beyond the time horizon of the study. The scenarios that have been developed thus map an 
area of maneuverability for energy R&D strategies: they link energy policy goals and 
likely technological achievements with broad European and world evolutions, and, in view 
of the optimistic "stable globe" hypothesis, they represent best-case strategies for Europe. 
General economic growth, the dependence on oil imports, and the nuclear power build-
up are all- directly linked; alternative energy sources will not provide much more flexibility 
before 2000. This means that any developments that further restrict maneuverability 
will necessitate greater improvements in productivity, further exploitation of resources, 
a higher import dependence, or lower economic and social aspirations. 
The macroeconomic model that determines the most productive use of capital, 
labor, and energy indicates that conservation may not be a reasonable way of stabilizing 
the international balance of demand and supply: in all the scenarios it was found that saving 
one unit of energy reduced the GDP by about five times the economic value of the 
conserved energy unit. That is, reducing the energy input into the EC economy by sub-
stituting highly productive capital or labor reduces the GDP by far more than the value of 
the energy conserved. 
Conclusions 
The goal of the study was to investigate the implications of the findings of IIASA's 
global energy study for the countries of the European Communities. No optimal energy 
strategy has been identified. Indeed, the European energy problem cannot be solved by 
considering the energy sector in isolation and seeking to design technical or technoeconomic 
solutions. The energy problem must be seen to be part of a more comprehensive challenge 
facing Europe that demands a flexibility of response in technology, in economic develop-
ment, in international cooperation, and in lifestyle adaptations, to temper regional interests 
in order to bring global energy demand and supply into balance. 
If the EC countries want to achieve a measure of independence from the increasingly 
uncertain development of international energy relations, a policy of building up internal 
supply capacity should be investigated, even at production cost levels well above current 
international energy prices. This policy could be tested using the scenarios to determine 
the sensitivity of the EC countries to fluctuations in global conditions governing its access 
to external energy resources. Supplies could be supplemented by energy imports that in a 
case of classical resource shortage would not automatically be in demand in other indus-
trialized regions. Uranium and low quality coal might be suitable, but this would presup-
pose independent European technological programs that differ from R&D programs for 
resource exploitation in the rest of the developed world. 
Traditional economic cost-minimizing principles will never, against a background of 
rising energy costs, stimulate the technological innovation needed to take Europe up to 
the energy transition. Furthermore, the less rewarding the basis on which the old infra-
structure operates, the slower is the rate at which a new and even less rewarding energy 
system can be introduced. This means that the transition to a sustainable energy system is 
likely to become more difficult the longer it is postponed, in which case time also becomes 
limited and precious. 
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FUELING EUROPE IN THE FUTURE 
The Long-Term Energy Problem in the EC Countries: 
Alternative R&D Strategies 
W. Sassin, A. Hölzl, H.-H. Rogner, and L. Schrattenholzer 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Austria 
ABSTRACT 
Under a contract from the Commission of the European Communities, the linkage 
between the energy problem and the national R&D strategies of the EC countries was 
investigated in the light of the results of IIASA's long-term global energy study, docu-
mented in Energy in a Finite World (1981). By considering what may be feasible over the 
next fifty years in other industrialized world regions, substantial discordance is revealed 
between the desires of the EC countries for economic growth, energy conservation, and 
energy imports, and the need for a global balance between energy demand and supply. 
A way of gradually harmonizing regional energy strategies with the constraints on 
resources and technologies identified in the IIASA global scenarios has been developed. 
The two alternative scenarios developed are based on a macroeconomically optimal alloca-
tion of capital, manpower, and energy. Given the limited oil imports of the EC in IIASA's 
global projections, two limiting scenarios are presented to indicate the narrow technolog-
ical choice in a medium- to long-term future for the EC countries of low economic growth. 
The two scenarios have either coal or nuclear power as the favored energy option, supple-
mented by the other source. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of the present study was to translate the results of IIASA's globally 
comprehensive investigation of the long-term energy problem to an intermediate level — 
the level of the European Communities. Globally compatible energy strategies were com-
pared with potential energy strategies reflecting the preferences of the member countries 
of the European Communities. Alternative strategies can be devised when such compari-
sons reveal significant discrepancies between a bottom-up approach (Western Europe's 
view of the world) and a top-down approach (the world's view of Western Europe). Devel-
oping an alternative European energy strategy capable of harmonizing regional and global 
outlooks allows us to assess the impacts of external constraints and limitations on the 
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evolution of European energy technologies and to design resilient energy R&D strategies. 
In more general terms: once translations from the global level to the EC level are consistently 
quantified, the prospects for Europe of coping with the energy problem in a competitive 
world context can be assessed against a neutral global yardstick. 
We note here that the methodology developed and applied under this contract could 
also be used to interlink the aggregate intermediate level of the EC and each of its nine 
(at the time of this study) member countries. Investigations of this kind were not under­
taken under this contract, however. 
The report summarizes the collaborative work of the services of the European Com­
mission and the Energy Systems Program of IIASA in several blocks. Each block comprises 
a problem­oriented investigation and the direct results obtained within the confines of the 
question that guided each particular investigation. Figure 1.1 lists these blocks arranged in 
the order of the work. The evolution of the scenarios, their relative divergence, and the 
steps taken to harmonize the EC outlook with the IIASA global scenarios used as a yard­
stick are thus self­evident from the figure; in fact, Figure 1.1 represents a learning process. 
The short­term European energy problem was caused by the recent dramatic 
changes in world energy markets. Reactions to this imported problem clearly have to con­
centrate first on appropriate technical adjustments within the energy system;here improved 
energy efficiencies, energy conservation, and the utilization of alternative indigenous and 
extraneous supplies are foremost. 
At a later stage of the investigation it became obvious that the long­term European 
energy problem will have a distinct home­made aspect. In time, Europe's ability to adapt 
the structure of the productive and consumptive parts of its economy to a new energy 
supply situation will substantially influence the nature of its energy problem. Questions 
of labor productivity, savings rates and balance of payments problems, and substitution 
between capital, labor, and energy increasingly influence energy scenarios. Ultimately the 
EC study and the IIASA/EC study together produced a set of nine scenarios. These vary 
basically in their projections of energy­consuming and energy­producing technologies, and 
in some parameters describing general economic evolution. 
All the scenarios are biased with regard to one principal assumption: smooth evolu­
tion. The various data inputs, whether technical or economic parameters, and the contin­
uation of present decision criteria (e.g. cost minimization, limitations on import depen­
dence, absence of new cartels) assume a stable and cooperating world. The possibility of 
discontinuities, in the form of changes in certain constraints or decision criteria within 
the time horizon of the study, is excluded. The internal stability of the model calculations 
is largely a consequence of this basic assumption. For this reason alone the scenarios could 
not be taken as predictions of the future. Furthermore, none of the scenarios implies a 
balanced set of economic and technical assumptions. Instead of covering likely evolutions, 
each scenario tries to take one single substrategy to its credible limits in order to explore 
its problem solving potential. Thus, to a limited extent, the interplay of the energy prob­
lem with other evolutions can be traced. Throughout the study, in fact, the energy prob­
lem has always been understood as part of a more comprehensive challenge to Europe, 
requiring a flexible response in the fields of technology, economic development, lifestyle 
adaptation, and also international relations. Certain aspects of this challenge are gauged in 
this particular methodological approach when a balance between demand and supply of 
energy has to be achieved in each scenario. Thus, ah the scenarios taken together map an 
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FIGURE 1.1 Schematic diagram of the IIASA/EC Study. 
area of future maneuverability. It is on this basis that energy R&D strategies must be 
assessed. Though limited by the assumption of a stable and cooperating world, the set of 
scenarios interlinks particular energy R&D goals and eventual technological achievements 
with a broader set of European and world evolutions. 
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Should the goals be set too low or should the actual deployment of energy technol­
ogies fall short of the levels assumed in the scenarios, the area of maneuverability defined 
by the variations in the set of assumptions would necessarily become even smaller. The 
problem would then become one of further improving capital and labor productivity, of 
exploiting resources so far conserved, of political compensation for import dependence, 
and of lowering economic and social aspirations. 
In line with the main objective of the study — to translate the findings of IIASA's 
global energy analysis to the level of the European Communities — no optimal energy 
strategy for Europe has been identified. In view of the crucial hypothesis of a stable and 
cooperating global system, the scenarios in this report essentially outline best­case energy 
strategies for Europe. We hope that our study will form a cornerstone for further work 
that would fix strategic R&D goals for energy, taking due account of the uncertainties of 
the real world — competing and potentially unstable. 
2 GLOBAL ENERGY PERSPECTIVES AND THE EC OUTLOOK 
The point of departure for the study was the two sets of future scenarios that evolved 
from two separate analytical efforts. The Energy Systems Program Group of IIASA com­
pleted in 1979 a high and a low global scenario, encompassing a range of possible evolu­
tions of the global balance of energy demand and supply. The IIASA scenarios assess real­
istic possibilities for developing the energy systems of seven distinct and globally compre­
hensive world regions by referring to an exceptionally favorable state of world affairs — 
stable and cooperating by definition — over the next fifty years (Häfele 1981). 
At the same time, a working group from the EC, the International Energy Agency 
(IEA), and IIASA finished the first­ever quantification of the long­term energy future of 
the EC. The EC results were formulated as five alternative scenarios in Crucial Choices for 
the Energy Transition (Commission of the European Communities 1980). The two 
sets of scenarios use the same types of formalized computer models and draw partly on 
identical or related data bases, but they focus on different aspects of the energy problem. 
The quantitative results, and more so the conclusions of both sets of scenarios, do 
not fully coincide. Rather, conflicting strategies can be elicited from the two sets of sce­
narios. This is not unreasonable, since the objectives of a national or in our case an EC 
energy strategy do not necessarily conform with the need of an interlinked global system 
for the consistent evolution of its constituent parts. 
2.1 The Methodological Approach 
Before the main results of both studies are summarized, a brief outline of the com­
mon methodology is given. It enables us to specify which objectives and which activities 
eventually shape a particular energy strategy. The methodology also to some extent de­
termines future perspectives: it reduces the many aspects of potential evolutions to those 
aspects that can be quantified using today's comprehensive national and international 
statistical services. 
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Figure 2.1 specifies the elements of a set of computer models capable of producing 
a balance between demand and supply of energy over several decades. The computer 
models need quantitative inputs. Some of these inputs relate to future evolutions in energy-
related fields. Depending on the sequence of model operations, these inputs either act as 
driving variables representing prescribed objectives or assume the function of strategic ele-
ments contributing to the solution of the energy problem. 
World regional energy 
models 
Consistency 
checks 
Final 
consumers 
Energy 
demand 
Energy 
supply 
Energy costs 
Energy in the 
macroeconomy 
GDP intersectoral 
exchange 
Energy exchange 
with other world 
regions 
Objectives and projection 
of structural information 
Demographic evolution 
Economic growth; 
structural changes; 
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Resources, evolution of 
energy production; 
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deployment constraints 
(e.g. build-up rates, import 
or export restrictions) 
Labor growth; 
productivity growth; 
consumption/savings ratio; 
elasticities of production 
factors 
FIGURE 2.1 Model elements for generating scenarios of the European energy future. 
Future economic growth assumed the role of a normative (prescribed) driving force 
in both the global and the EC analyses. Its evolution as presently foreseen, together with 
projections of demographic growth and technical changes in lifestyles (expressed as struc-
tural changes between the main sectors of the economy and predicted changes in the energy 
intensity of each sector), determine the demand for final energy. The projected lifestyle 
changes imply a broad spectrum of policy actions aimed at energy conservation. Whether 
these actions will be economically justified by energy price increases, or whether their 
side effects will accumulate to present insurmountable obstacles to conservation are, and 
will remain, open questions. At this point, informed judgment is the only means of con-
fining the set of technical lifestyle adjustments within a reasonable overall evolution. 
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Such judgment is aided, however, by comparing the effects of different lifestyle changes 
and consumer technologies on the spectrum and time evolution of final energy forms. 
Alternative demand scenarios were explored at different stages of both analyses and 
gradually converged to "middle-of-the-road" paths. It is important to note that such 
exercises quickly show diminishing'returns for energy conservation that results from ex-
treme lifestyle prescriptions. 
The second distinct step in the methodology of Figure 2.1 is to consider the al-
ternatives for providing the amount of final energy demanded using available resources 
and production and conversion technologies. The overall minimum cost for the total 
energy supply over the fifty years considered is the central objective in the allocation 
of primary energy forms. The macroeconomic rationale is to impose the least possible 
burden on the economy as a whole. Energy trade with other world regions enriches the 
potential supply patterns. 
To arrive at a global supply balance, the IIASA approach introduces self-sufficiency 
objectives for some world regions and a maximum earnings strategy for oil exports from 
the Middle East and northern Africa. These strategy provisos necessarily lead to cost dif-
ferentials for regional energy availability. (This consistency problem disappears for quan-
titative reasons in most of the IIASA world regions.) Again, judgment is needed to weigh 
the benefits of regional independence against the concomitant elevated internal costs. 
Fundamentally different conditions obtain for the EC, however. The extremely 
unfavorable position with regard to fossil resources suggests introducing into the supply 
allocation procedure limits to the availability of primary energy forms; at the same time, 
minimizing vulnerability suggests setting upper bounds for overall import dependence. 
The narrow resource base, together with supply policy constraints, largely determines the 
supply allocation of the EC. Energy costs have only a marginal influence in this stage of 
the balancing procedure for the EC. 
A crucial feedback'between the output of the resource allocation model and the in-
puts to the demand model of the first step results from an assessment of how the resource 
situation changes over the course of time. 
Figure 2.2 summarizes the main judgmental interventions that shaped the process 
of scenario writing for the long-term global evolution. This figure specifies the formalized 
models and the particular consistency checks behind the two scenarios for IIASA's world 
regions: the global High Scenario and the global Low Scenario. Both these comprise 
distinct scenarios for each of the seven world regions that were considered. Figure 2.2 is 
thus a particular implementation of the methodology shown in Figure 2.1. The outstand-
ing problem of this global scenario writing process was the interplay between the deple-
tion of fossil fuel resources and overall global economic development. Three phases of 
"reactions" to the quantitative responses of the models led to corrections to initially fixed 
objectives or to estimates of evolutionary trends. Firstly, unconventional fossil as well as 
renewable resources and, secondly, enhanced energy conservation were introduced in con-
secutive feedback loops. Eventually, substantially reduced economic growth had to be 
considered in view of the aggregate estimates of technologically accessible energy resources. 
The objective in balancing energy demand and supply in the five EC scenarios was 
different from that in the two IIASA global scenarios. Whereas the IIASA study tried to 
determine the possible overall evolution of the global energy system, the EC study focused 
on technological responses of the EC to an energy problem that was assumed to remain 
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within the energy sector. The methodology of Figure 2.1 is flexible enough to cover these 
different strategic emphases. However, the implementation of the scenario writing process 
in the Crucial Choices study (Commission of the European Communities 1980) led to dif-
ferent decision patterns. Figure 2.3 records the conflicting policy variables "technological 
preference" and "energy import dependence limit" in the feedback loop connecting the 
output of the energy supply model and the inputs of the energy demand model, as well as 
the normative constraints to the supply model. These latter constraints reflect the esti-
mated conditions on global energy markets, to the extent that they affect the EC. 
A comparison of Figures 2.2 and 2.3 reveals that the conceptual differences in the 
studies of the global and the EC energy problem were mainly confined to these judgmental 
adjustments in the respective feedback loops. The twofold concerns dominating the EC 
scenario writing process partly explain why five EC scenarios were developed but only 
two scenarios in IIASA's study of the global evolution. 
The common methodology of both studies (see Figure 2.1) contains a third stage. It 
is designed to assess the impacts of the energy sector operations, balanced in the preceding 
two stages of demand and supply modeling, in terms of macroeconomic relationships. In 
principle, such impacts allow the introduction of alternative feedback loops connecting 
the macroeconomic level and the microeconomic level of either energy consumers or 
energy suppliers. Such feedbacks have not been incorporated to yield alternative scenarios, 
either in the global analysis by IIASA or in the Crucial Choices study. Instead, changes in 
macroeconomic parameters have been monitored for both sets of scenarios. They can be 
interpreted as provisos to be fulfilled by institutional and political adjustments to the 
perceived energy problem. 
For the global study, the changes in the industrial structure of each world region as 
a consequence of constructing the energy supply system were an important concern. Con-
sequently, investment requirements, both direct and indirect, and manpower and materials 
balances were calculated. These provide a basis for judging the plausibility of the driving 
assumptions on economic growth and structural change that influence the energy demand 
projections. However, no modifications to the scenario writing process were made on the 
basis of the significant macroeconomic changes identified. 
In contrast to the global study, considerations of energy investments in relation to 
total capital investment rates and import bills for energy were in the forefront of this 
monitoring phase of the EC study. This is a direct consequence of the high energy import 
dependence and the need for an early and quick modification of the existing EC energy 
supply system. Again, macroeconomic evolutions and changes of present macrocharacter-
istics were monitored for the five EC scenarios that resulted from the procedures shown 
in Figure 2.3, but no iterative modification of the scenarios was made in the EC study. 
After this brief description of the general approach and the specific objectives of 
the two independent analytical efforts, it should be pointed out that the differing evolu-
tions of the energy systems in the seven scenarios that existed at the start of this contract 
study must be seen as being the answers to different questions. The quantitative details 
are summarized briefly in sections 2.2 and 2.3. 
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2.2 The Potential Evolution of Industrialized Countries with Scarce Energy Resources 
in the IIASA Global Scenarios 
The nine countries of the EC are included in IIASA's World Region III, which is a 
conglomeration of highly developed industrialized countries, basically the OECD group 
without the USA and Canada. Figure 2.4 identifies Region III and the other IIASA world 
regions. Japan and most of the countries of northern and southern Europe are in a position 
similar to that of the EC countries with regard to their medium­ and long­term energy 
problems, and consequently have been treated in parallel by IIASA. The economic growth 
rates of all regions are given in Table 2.1 for the IIASA High and Low Scenarios. The 
MEDEE model (Khan and Hölzl 1980; Lapillonne 1978) calculations for Region III result 
in the demand spectra for secondary energy shown in Figures 2.5 and 2.6. On the basis of 
the estimated global availability of energy resources, the MESSAGE model (see Appendix) 
V//A Region I 
Region II 
Region III 
Region IV 
Region V 
(NA) North America 
(SU/EE) Soviet Union and Eastern Europe 
(WE/JANZ) Western Europe, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, 
South Africa, and Israel 
(LA) Latin America 
(Af/SEA) Africa (except northern Africa and South Africa), 
south and south­east Asia 
Region VI (ME/NAf) Middle East and northern Africa 
Region VII (C/CPA) China and centrally planned Asian economies 
FIGURE 2.4 The seven world regions analyzed in the IIASA global energy study. 
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allocates a cost­optimal primary energy supply to Region III, which draws heavily on 
energy imports. Figures 2.7 and 2.8 show the contributions of coal, oil, gas, nuclear 
power, and renewable energy resources to meeting the needs of Region III. 
Figure 2.9 specifies the energy imports and exports of Region III in relation to the 
other oil­trading world regions. An abrupt transition in the allocation of energy exports 
from the resource­rich developing countries of Region IV (Latin America) and Region V 
(the Middle East and northern Africa) at about the turn of the century is forecast in both 
the IIASA scenarios. At this time Region V (central Africa, southern Asia, and parts of 
south­east Asia) switches from being a net exporter of energy to being a net energy 
importer. The present oil buying competition between Region I (North America) and 
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FIGURE 2.7 Primary energy supply, IIASA Region III, High Scenario, (a) Relative; (b) absolute. 
LWR, light water reactor; FBR, fast breeder reactor. 
Region III (Western Europe, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and Israel) 
would presumably then be succeeded by competition between Region III and Region V. 
If Region I does not succeed in reducing its oil imports essentially to zero by this time, the 
competition between developed and developing countries for imported oil could become 
even sharper. The timing of the expected transition differs by only a few years in the 
High Scenario and in the Low Scenario. 
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The total import dependence of Region III, including coal and gas imports, is shown 
in Figure 2.10. The main features of the evolving supply system of Region III are clearly a 
shift from the strong dependence on oil imported from the OPEC countries to an equally 
strong dependence on coal and gas originating from North America, Eastern Europe, and 
the Soviet Union. Neither EC imports, nor imports into Japan, from Australia and South 
Africa show up in the import volumes of Region III; Australia, South Africa, and Norway 
are included in Region III, and consequently their resources contribute to the indigenous 
production of this region, even when these are traded between countries within the region. 
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TABLE 2.1 Projections of gross domestic product growth influenced by the energy problem: the IIASA High and Low 
Scenarios. Note: all growth rates are average annual growth rates (rounded) over the time period shown; actual projections 
show declining growth rates. 
Region 
I(NA) 
II (SU/EE) 
III (WE/JANZ) 
rV(LA) 
V (Af/SEA) 
VI (ME/NAf) 
VII (C/CPA) 
Historical 
growth rate of 
per capita GDP, 
1950-1975 
(per cent per year) 
1.9 
6.7 
4.0 
2.9 
2.5 
5.7 
5.1 
GDP per 
capita, 1975 
(US dollars) 
7,046 
2,562 
4,259 
1,066 
239 
1,429 
352 
Projected growth rate of per ι 
High Scenario 
1975-
2.9 
3.6 
3.0 
3.0 
2.8 
3.8 
2.8 
-2000 2000-
1.8 
3.2 
1.8 
2.4 
2.4 
2.8 
2.4 
-2030 
:apita GDP (per cent per year) 
Low Scenario 
1975-
1.7 
3.1 
1.7 
1.6 
1.7 
2.4 
1.6 
-2000 2000-2030 
0.7 
1.9 
0.9 
1.9 
1.4 
1.2 
1.4 
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FIGURE 2.10 Energy imports of Region III in the IIASA High and Low Scenarios. 
Table 2.1 and Figures 2.5—2.10 quantify possible evolutions of the energy systems 
of a larger group of countries than just those members of the EC. It is repeated here that 
any assessment or any comparison with projections by or for the EC has to take note of 
the objectives that guided the development of these scenarios; these objectives have been 
outlined earlier in the comparative description of the methodological approach. Readers 
desiring more information are referred to the specific details reported in the 850­page 
reference volume of the IIASA study, Energy in a Finite World (Energy Systems Program 
Group of IIASA 1981). 
2.3 The Long­Term EC Energy Scenarios 
Starting from demographic projections together with projections concerning labor 
markets, a high and a low economic growth path were identified for the EC. These projec­
tions include extrapolations of labor productivity and trends observed before 1975, as 
well as judgments on long­term economic saturation effects. In Figure 2.11a high and a 
low growth path of gross domestic product (GDP) are given. They embrace a range of 
possible developments that were considered feasible in the light of the interdependence of 
labor markets and macroeconomic outputs observed in the past behavior of the EC eco­
nomies. Together with projections of technological changes in the various consuming sec­
tors of the EC economies, the high and the low economic growth paths translate into 
alternative evolutions of final energy demand (Figure 2.12). Initially moderate and later 
high energy conservation rates were combined with the high economic growth path, 
whereas the low economic growth path assumed a high degree of conservation from the 
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base year 1975 onward. As a result of the difficulties encountered during the analytical 
efforts to meet these demands within technical and policy constraints on the energy supply 
system of the EC, two further demand cases were subsequently added. These are also 
shown in Figure 2.12. Here the energy savings through conservation efforts in the high 
growth case are augmented by a slower growth in energy demand due to a reduction in the 
economic growth potential beyond the year 2000. The various cases combine alternative 
technological strategies, i.e. projections of more or less successful deployment of the various 
energy supply chains, together with invariably optimistic estimates of indigenous resources 
and import quantities of oil, gas, coal, and uranium. However, normative assumptions 
about the maximum tolerable overall dependence on energy imports, as well as about a 
balanced relationship between the contributions of individual primary energy forms, ap­
peared necessary in order to limit the strain on the supply technologies. Of the five cases 
that were ultimately quantified, Case Ha is of particular importance. It is termed the 
Acceptable Dependence Case to underline the fact that it provides for a balanced energy 
supply system, complying with the two assumed policy goals of the EC of a maximum 
dependence on energy imports of less than 50% and a limit to the contribution of any 
one primary energy carrier of 30% of the total supply. The price of this balanced supply 
is a reduced economic growth potential and a high energy conservation requirement. The 
supply structure of this case is given in Figure 2.13. A careful analysis of the different 
scenarios reveals the lack of flexibility in a policy of compensating for delays in the de­
ployment of any one energy source by drawing more heavily on an alternative source. In 
fact, the allocation of energy sources in the EC scenarios is determined only to a very 
small degree by energy price or cost relationships. Instead, the system is determined by 
the fixed economic goals and the total set of constraints that characterize the EC resource 
situation, by import expectations, and also by the economic structure and its maximum 
adjustment rate. Most crucially, these severe constraints arise despite comparatively high 
technical conservation projections and a rather optimistic assessment of energy imports 
with regard to both quantities and prices. 
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3 A COMPARISON OF THE GLOBAL AND THE EC SCENARIOS 
To repeat here what was said in section 2.1, the IIASA scenarios and the EC scenarios 
must be seen as answers to different questions. Nevertheless, these answers do have a 
common basis. They derive from identical models and from data sets that are used in 
both analyses. Moreover, as the EC energy system constitutes a substantial part of the 
global energy system, it directly influences the "exogenous" conditions of the global 
energy markets subject to which EC energy strategies are formulated. The quantities of 
energy imported under such strategies must always fit into the global balance, taking ac-
count of the preparedness of all producers to export and the abilities of all consumers to 
import. The position of a group of countries such as the EC within the global energy trade 
pattern is not determined solely by energy price levels, either in reality or in the formalized 
scenario writing procedures. An economy, depending on the efficiency with which it can 
convert energy into marketable commodities, will be able to command a larger or smaller 
share of the limited global energy supply over a period of time. This would cause a 
correspondingly more or less severe energy problem elsewhere in the world, however. 
A careful comparison of the global scenarios of the IIASA and the EC scenarios 
provides a first-order evaluation of the extent to which the estimates of realizable import 
volumes and conservation potentials in the EC scenarios described in section 2.3 indirectly 
rely on "exporting" the energy problem. 
In order to draw such a comparison, it was necessary to disaggregate the IIASA 
Region III, i.e. the OECD countries excluding the USA and Canada, into the EC countries 
and a group comprising the remaining countries of Region III. For many reasons, the de-
mand and supply pattern of the respective IIASA scenarios for Region III cannot just be 
disaggregated according to any fixed parameter ratios. Instead, two subscenarios had to 
be developed, specifying the possible evolution of the EC, in the first instance within the 
set of asssumptions determining the IIASA High Scenario, and in the second within those 
of the IIASA Low Scenario. For this process of scenario writing, the basic methodology of 
Figure 2.1 was implemented in a specialized form. It deviates distinctly from the iterative 
procedure outlined in Figure 2.2. Figure 3.1 indicates the main steps of disaggregation that 
led to the two scenarios, labeled IIASA/EC High and Low. The hypothesis needed to 
"allocate the global energy problem" between the EC countries and the other countries 
of Region III relates to the relative economic growth potentials of these two competing 
groups of industrialized countries. In line with the energy conservation assumptions in the 
IIASA scenarios for Region III, structural evolutions for the different economic sectors 
were fixed in order to ensure comparable overall economic energy elasticities for both 
subregions as well as to conform to the fixed aggregate gross domestic product (GDP) 
evolution and final energy demand figures for Region III. The details of this step are ex-
plained in section 3.1.1. 
The determination of the supply parts of the IIASA/EC High and Low Scenarios 
involved less additional normative information. Here the ambiguities reside more or less in 
the allocation of the oil import volumes for Region HI and in the availability of uranium. 
The allocation can mainly be assessed through the resulting total supply pattern for the 
two subregions. The tendency was to select a more favorable allocation for the EC, driving 
the other Region III countries into a faster nuclear build-up and higher coal utilization 
shares than the EC. The resulting supply scenarios are specified in section 3.1.2. 
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FIGURE 3.1 Tne process of scenario writing: IIASA/EC High and Low Scenarios. 
The availability of top­down scenarios, here the IIASA/EC scenarios, and the bottom­
up scenarios of Crucial Choices for the Energy Transition (Commission of the European 
Communities 1980) allowed a direct comparison of the projections of different state 
variables. The substantial discrepancies are explained in section 3.2. 
3.1 The EC as a Subregion of the Global Energy System 
3.1.1 The Evolution of Final Energy Demand 
The main features of the IIASA scenarios are summarized in section 2.1. The scenar­
ios are described in more detail in Part IV of Energy in a Finite World. Regional disaggrega­
tion had to be limited in that study: the presently developed market economies (mostly 
OECD countries) were divided into just two sets, namely Region I (North America) and 
Region III (OECD countries excluding North America, together with a few non­OECD 
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FIGURE 3.2 The distribution of GDP per capita in 1975 for Region III and subregions. Source: OECD 
(1979a). 
countries such as Yugoslavia, South Africa, and Israel). Naturally, Region III is a very 
inhomogeneous set of countries, geographically, politically, and economically. A further 
subdivision singling out EC countries distinguishes three groups for the final demand 
assessment: EC, the member countries of the European Communities in 1975; OWE 
(other Western European countries); and OR3 (other Region III countries). Figure 3.2 
shows the distribution of GDP per capita in 1975 for these groups. The ranges are 
US$2600­7400* for the EC, USS900­8500 for OWE, and US$1200­6300 for OR3. 
Although this subdivision reduces the geographical and political inhomogeneity, the 
disparity in terms of economic development remains in all three subregions, but especially 
in OWE. 
*A11 monetary units in this report are given in US dollars at 1975 prices and calculated using 1975 ex­
change rates. 
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The population projections for the three subregions are shown in Figure 3.3. They 
were supplied by Keyfitz (1977) on a country­by­country basis. The aggregate corresponds 
to the population evolution used in the scenarios for Region III. Although the population 
of Region III is expected to increase from 560 million in 1975 to 767 million by 2030, 
this Region's proportion of world population decreases from 19% to 10%. Within Region 
III, the EC shows the lowest rate of population growth, with an expected increase in 
population from 258 million in 1975 (46% of Region III) to 304 million by 2030 (40% of 
Region III). The potential labor force — i.e. the percentage of the population between 
fifteen and sixty­four years old — remains fairly constant in the EC (64%) and OR3 
(65%), but increases in OWE from 61% in 1975 to 66% by 2030. 
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FIGURE 3.3 Population projections for Region III and subregions. Source: Keyfitz (1979). 
The gross domestic product (GDP) growth projections were originally estimated not 
for each country individually but for the OECD countries (excluding North America) in 
aggregate. Figure 3.4 shows the evolution of the GDP shares of the three subregions in the 
total GDP of Region III between 1963 and 1977. The share of the EC declined steadily 
from 65% to 57%, and that of OWE remained almost constant (16­17%), while OR3 ­
which is dominated by Japan — increased its share from 18% to 26%. The different eco­
nomic growth potentials of the past are likely to persist into the future; at least, there are 
no straightforward arguments suggesting a reversal of such trends. The contributions of 
the subregions to the total economic output of Region III were therefore assumed to 
change in accordance with the overall growth potential of each region. Transition matrices 
were estimated both from observations for the whole period 1963—1977 and from obser­
vations for 1968­1977. 
The projected increase in the total GDP of IIASA's Region HI, from US(1975)$2400 
billion in 1975 to US(1975)$ 11,700 billion in 2030 (High Scenario), translates into a 
decline in the GDP share of the EC from 57% to 46% (using a transition matrix based on 
the period 1963­1977) or from 57% to 51% (using a transition matrix based on the period 
1968­1977). Because of Japan's heavy reliance on raw material imports and exports of 
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manufactured goods, and the difficulties expected in the future in these areas, it was 
considered reasonable to choose the latter matrix for the projections. This implies a con­
tinuation of higher growth in Japan than in other Region III countries, but a considerably 
less favorable development than that suggested by the evolution in the early 1960s. 
On comparing the GDP growth assumptions of the EC High (H) and Low (L) Sce­
narios in Crucial Choices for the Energy Transition (Commission of the European Com­
munities, 1980) with the IIASA High Scenario projections for Region III (see Figure 3.5), 
it turns out that the IIASA High Scenario for Region HI is close to the EC low growth 
scenario (Case IV). This discrepancy points either to pessimism in the IIASA scenarios or 
to substantial optimism in the EC scenarios. 
Figure 3.6 shows the GDP growth rates for the IIASA/EC cases derived from the 
IIASA Region III projections. These are reasonably consistent with the growth rates pro­
jected for the other IIASA regions, but they seem hardly acceptable on a national level. 
Nevertheless, these low economic growth rates were considered necessary in order to 
match energy demand and supply on a global level. 
Tables 3.1—3.3 summarize the GDP growth projections for Region III and those 
derived for the EC. Between 1975 and 2030 the GDP of Region III increases by a factor 
of 2.8­4.9, and that of the EC by a factor of 2.5—4.2. On a per capita basis, however, the 
EC would still have a slightly higher GDP growth rate than other Region HI countries. 
For an assessment of energy demand, in addition to the evolution of total GDP, the 
growth rates of various sectors have to be projected. Within the framework of MEDEE­2, 
the sectoral breakdown of energy demand is as follows (for a summary description of 
MEDEE­2 see Chateau and Lapillonne 1977; Lapillonne 1978; and Khan and Hölzl 1980): 
— production of goods 
— freight transportation 
— passenger transportation 
— households 
— service sector. 
The goods­producing sector is further divided into 
— agriculture 
— construction 
— industry (excluding energy producers) 
— energy producers (for accounting purposes only; their energy demand is not 
treated in MEDEE­2). 
Within agriculture and construction, the essential energy demand is for motor fuel; 
electricity and thermal energy use are not generally very significant in these sectors. 
Industries (excluding energy producers) are classified into three categories, namely 
industries producing predominantly 
— basic materials 
— machinery and equipment 
— nondurable goods. 
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TABLE 3.1 Annual GDP of IIASA/EC and IIASA Region III, 1975­2030. 
High Scenario 
Region III 
IIASA/EC 
percentage of Region 
Low Scenario 
Region HI 
IIASA/EC 
III 
percentage of Region III 
GDP (thousand billion US(1975) dollars) 
1975 
2.4 
1.4 
57 
2.4 
1.4 
57 
1985 
3.6 
2.0 
54 
3.3 
1.8 
55 
2000 
6.0 
3.2 
53 
4.5 
2.4 
53 
2015 
8.7 
4.5 
52 
5.6 
2.9 
53 
2030 
11.7 
6.0 
51 
6.7 
3.5 
52 
TABLE 3.2 GDP per capita for IIASA/EC and IIASA Region III, 1975­2030. 
GDP per capita (thousand US(1975) dollars) 
1975 
4.3 
5.3 
4.3 
5.3 
1985 
5.9 
7.3 
5.3 
6.7 
2000 
8.8 
11.1 
6.5 
8.3 
2015 
12.0 
15.3 
7.7 
9.9 
2030 
15.2 
19.8 
8.7 
11.5 
High Scenario 
Region III 
IIASA/EC 
Low Scenario 
Region III 
IIASA/EC 
TABLE 3.3 Average annual GDP growth rates for IIASA/EC and Region HI. 
High Scenario 
Region III 
IIASA/EC 
Low Scenario 
Region III 
IIASA/EC 
Annual GDP growth rate (per cent 
1975­
4.30 
3.84 
3.17 
2.82 
­1985 1985­
3.40 
3.16 
2.10 
1.91 
­2000 
per year) 
2000­
2.50 
2.40 
1.50 
1.41 
­2015 2015­2030 
2.00 
1.95 
1.20 
1.16 
The first category includes mining (excluding coal, oil, and gas), basic metal industries, 
nonmetallic mineral products, chemicals (excluding petroleum and coal products), and 
the paper and pulp industry. It is characterized by a high energy demand per unit output, 
for both electricity and thermal uses. The thermal energy demand of the basic metal and 
building material industries is mostly in the high temperature range (furnace), while the 
chemical and paper industries have a high demand for steam. The other two industry 
categories have relatively modest energy intensities: the machinery and equipment sector's 
thermal energy demand is in the medium­to­high temperature range (metal treatment), 
while the nondurable goods industries have a high demand for steam and hot water. In 
the latter two categories, space heating is also important. 
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Table 3.4 shows the growth rates of the various sectors assumed for Region III and 
for the EC in the High and Low Scenarios. A common feature is a significantly below 
average growth rate for agriculture, an above average growth rate in the service sector, and 
a slightly below average growth rate for industry. Within industry, basic materials and 
nondurables are expected to have below average growth rates, and the machinery and 
equipment sector to grow at the same rate as the GDP. 
TABLE 3.4 Growth rates in value-added assumed for the EC and for Region III 
(per cent per year, 1975-2030). 
Sector 
Agriculture 
Construction 
Industry (excluding energy) 
Basic materials 
Machinery and equipment 
Nondurables 
Energy 
Services 
Total GDP 
EC 
IIASA/EC 
High 
1.7 
2.7 
2.5 
2.7 
2.6 
3.0 
2.9 
2.7 
IIASA/EC 
Low 
1.2 
1.7 
1.5 
1.7 
1.6 
1.9 
1.8 
1.7 
Region III 
High 
1.4 
2.7 
2.3 
3.0 
2.2 
3.1 
3.3 
2.9 
Low 
0.7 
1.8 
1.4 
1.9 
1.5 
2.1 
2.1 
1.9 
The structural changes implied by these growth rates, in addition to efficiency im-
provements and fuel mix changes, contribute to the fall in the average energy intensity of 
manufacturing industries, as detailed in Tables 3.5 and 3.6. The annual rate of reduction 
of energy intensity (i.e. kilowatt-hours per US (1975) dollar GDP) is 0.9% for Region III 
and 1.5% for the EC in the period 1975-1985, but is expected to decrease to values of 
0.4% (Low Scenario) or 0.6-0.7% (High Scenario). We adopted a higher value in the High 
Scenario, assuming a quicker renewal of capital stock under these conditions than in a 
low growth environment. The higher rate for the EC reflects the fact that there should be 
more scope — or rather a greater necessity — for reducing energy consumption in these 
countries than in Japan with its modern industry. 
The reduction of industrial energy intensity is shown in Table 3.6. This technological 
assumption might appear modest when compared with the 2.2% annual reduction achieved 
by the EC during the period 1960-1976, even more so the 2.7% per year in the USA and 
TABLE 3.5 Average energy intensity of manufacturing industries in the EC and in IIASA Region III, 
1975-2030. 
Average energy intensity of manufacturing industry 
(watt-years per US(1975) dollar GDP) 
1975 1985 2000 2015 2030 
Region III 0.91 0.83 (0.75-0.74) (0.70-067) (0.66-0.61) 
IIASA/EC 1.00 (0.87-0.86) (0.77-0.75) (0.70-0.67) (0.66-0.60) 
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TABLE 3.6 Average annual rate of reduction in energy intensity of manufacturing industries in the 
EC and in IIASA Region III, 1975­2030. 
Average annual rate of reduction in energy intensity (per cent per year) 
1975­1985 1985­2000 2000­2015 2015­2030 
Region HI 
IIASA/EC 
0.92 
(1.47­1.50) 
(0.67­0.76) 
(0.81­0.91) 
(0.46­0.66) 
(0.63­0.75) 
(0.39­0.62) 
(0.39­0.73) 
Japan. On the other hand, high growth rates, together with the shift from a coal­based 
energy system to one relying mostly on oil and gas, certainly played a major part in the 
rapid reduction, and similar opportunities are not to be expected in the future. 
Table 3.7 summarizes the assumptions in the scenarios concerning freight transport­
ation. Total activity is linked to GDP excluding services, i.e. the GDP contributions of the 
goods­producing sectors. Electricity consumption is converted to its primary energy equiv­
alent for purposes of comparison. In the Region III scenarios, both the fuel mix and the 
energy intensities were kept constant because of the uncertainties in the base year values. 
In the IIASA/EC scenarios a significant shift to rail is introduced, leading to a decline in 
the average energy intensity, as shown in Table 3.7. Motor fuel consumption for interna­
tional transportation and for military use is assumed to grow in proportion to GDP. 
Freight transportation accounts at present for about 24% of the total energy demand for 
transportation in the EC; this share increases to 31­34% in the scenarios. The share of 
TABLE 3.7 Freight transportation: summary characteristics. 
Activity (10' ton­kilometers) 
GDP excluding services (thousand 
billion dollars) 
Unit cost (ton­kilometers per US(1975) 
dollar) 
Energy intensity (kilowatt­hours per 
ton­kilometer)0 
Energy consumption (gigawatt­yearsb 
per year)" 
Share of total transportation energy 
(per cent) 
Energy consumption including inter­
national transportation and 
military use (gigawatt­years° per 
year)" 
Share of total transportation 
energy (per cent) 
IIASA/EC 
1975 
0.63 
0.62 
1.00 
0.59 
42.6 
24 
51.6 
30 
2030 
High 
2.51 
2.49 
1.00 
0.52 
148.6 
34 
188.5 
44 
Low 
1.51 
1.50 
100 
0.52 
88.8 
31 
111.9 
39 
Region 
1975 
1.52 
1.23 
1.20 
0.61 
105.0 
32 
127.2 
39 
III 
2030 
High 
6.02 
4.91 
1.20 
0.60 
415.2 
35 
523.8 
44 
Low 
3.67 
3.00 
1.20 
0.60 
253.0 
34 
314.8 
42 
"Electricity consumption converted to primary energy equivalent. 
b l gigawatt = 1 0 ' watts. 
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energy required for international transportation and military use increases from 6% in 
1975 to 8-10% by 2030. In Region III the initial share is higher than 6% because of the 
lower level of car ownership outside the EC, but it increases more slowly to a figure similar 
to that for the EC in 2030. 
Passenger transportation is not formally linked to an economic indicator in MEDEE-
2, although a correlation between travel intensity and GDP per capita certainly exists. For 
IIASA/EC, it is assumed that the travel intensity will increase from 9600 kilometers per 
person per year to 17,000—20,000 km per person per year by 2030; the corresponding 
assumption for Region HI was an increase from 9200 to 14,000—18,000 km per person 
per year. In the EC, car ownership increases from 270 to 400—500 per thousand persons 
by 2030, and in Region III from 190 to 3 1 0 ^ 5 0 by 2030. Whereas for cars a saturation 
of ownership and accordingly of total distance traveled can already be foreseen, air travel 
is only now becoming more widespread. Its share of total passenger-kilometers is assumed 
to increase to 6—12%. 
A major increase (30—40%) in the fuel efficiency of cars is assumed for both IIASA/ 
EC and Region III; in Region III, the shift to more energy-intensive modes (car and plane) 
offsets these improvements, while in the EC, with its present high share of car transporta-
tion, mass transit modes (train and bus) are assumed to increase their shares, contributing 
to a further reduction in the average energy intensity of passenger travel. The characteristics 
are summarized in Table 3.8. 
The household/service sector energy demand in industrialized countries is dominated 
by space heating. The large increase in space heating in the past was mainly due to the 
trend to central heating of the total residential floor area rather than just the living room. 
At present about 50% of dwellings in the EC and about 30% of dwellings in Region III as 
a whole are centrally heated. By 2030, the figure for the EC is assumed to be 100% in the 
High Scenario. The continued trend to central heating partly offsets the reductions in 
space heating demand that can be expected as a result of better insulation. Air conditioning 
is disregarded as a major consumer of energy in all EC scenarios. Electricity demand for 
household appliances is expected to increase, however, from 1500 kilowatt-hours per 
TABLE 3.8 Passenger transportation: summary characteristics. 
IIASA/EC 
2030 
1975 High Low 
Region III 
2030 
1975 High Low 
Activity (10' passenger-kilometers) 2.98 5.97 5.06 5.17 13.8 10.7 
Travel intensity (thousand kilometers 
per year) 
Proportion by car (per cent) 
Proportion by plane (per cent) 
Energy intensity (kilowatt-hours per 
passenger-kilometer)" 
Sectoral energy consumption 
(gigawatt-yearsb per year)" 
Share of transportation energy (per cent) 
"Electricity consumption converted to primary energy equivalent. 
bl gigawatt = 1 0 ' watts. 
9.6 
82 
1 
0.43 
122.6 
70 
19.7 
65 
12 
0.36 
242.4 
56 
16.6 
64 
6 
0.31 
177.7 
61 
9.2 
37 
3 
0.34 
198.0 
61 
18.0 
50 
11 
0.42 
657.4 
56 
14.0 
43 
6 
0.35 
427.5 
58 
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dwelling per year to 4500—6000 per dwelling per year in the EC. The present figure given 
for Region HI for this demand appears overestimated; on the other hand, the electricity 
consumption of the service sector was underestimated (see Tables 3.9 and 3.10). 
The results of the MEDEE calculations with the sectoral and technological changes 
described are given in Figures 3.7 and 3.8. Figure 3.7 shows the sectoral shares in con­
sumption and the shares in supply of various energy forms in the High Scenario for the 
EC and for Region III. In both cases the share of the household/service sector decreases as 
a result of relatively low population growth, saturation tendencies in some demand cate­
gories, and better system performance. Whereas for Region III this reduced share is offset 
by the increasing share of the transportation sector, this sector's share remains constant 
for the EC, and the industry share increases instead. Although electricity is assumed to 
penetrate only moderately into thermal uses in these scenarios, the electricity share in­
creases by about 60% in Region HI and by about 80% in the EC. Demand for motor fuel 
TABLE 3.9 Households: summary characteristics. 
Persons per dwelling 
Number of dwellings (millions) 
Useful energy per dwelling (thousand 
kilowatt­hours per year) 
Space and water heating (per cent) 
Cooking (per cent) 
Air conditioning (per cent) 
Electrical appliances (per cent) 
Total sectoral useful energy (gigawatt­
years per year) 
IIASA/EC 
1975 
2.98 
86 
18.3 
88 
4 
­
8 
180 
2030 
High 
2.30 
132 
24.5 
72 
3 
0 
25 
369 
Low 
21.6 
75 
4 
0 
21 
325 
Region 
1975 
3.00 
187 
12.7 
75 
10 
­
15" 
272" 
III 
2030 
High Low 
2.56 
300 
20.6 17.5 
62 65 
6 7 
3 2 
29 26 
705 600 
"Electricity use for electrical appliances was considerably overestimated in the base year (1975) for 
Region III; electricity use in the service sector was underestimated. 
TABLE 3.10 Service sector: summary characteristics. 
Floor area per worker (square meters) 
Total area (10' square meters) 
Useful energy per square meter 
(thousand kilowatt­hours per 
square meter per year) 
Specific electricity (per cent) 
Air conditioning (per cent) 
Thermal uses (per cent) 
Total sectoral useful energy 
(gigawatt­years per year) 
IIASA/EC 
2030 
1975 
29 
1.75 
0.28 
25 
1 
74 
57 
High 
42 
3.41 
0.26 
37 
9 
54 
101 
Low 
38 
3.00 
0.23 
33 
7 
60 
81 
Region 
1975 
28 
3.00 
0.15 
26° 
2 
72 
52" 
III 
2030 
High 
35 
7.26 
0.21 
50 
4 
46 
172 
Low 
32 
6.00 
0.19 
47 
3 
50 
130 
"Electricity use for electrical appliances was considerably overestimated in the base year (1975) for 
Region III; electricity use in the service sector was underestimated. 
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and feedstocks also increases considerably, while the share of fossil fuels for thermal uses 
declines from 60% to 40% in the EC and from 55% to 35% in Region III. It was assumed 
that coal use would increase in industry, but that its inconvenience would further diminish 
its share in the household/service sector. The main substitute for oil for thermal uses is 
expected to be gas (see Figure 3.8). 
Although the energy demand assessment was made on the basis of specific sectoral 
and technological assumptions, the uncertainty in many details necessitates a feasibility 
check on an aggregate level. Table 3.11 and Figure 3.9 present some aggregate indicators 
of the evolution outlined in these scenarios. In the High Scenario, final energy consump-
tion per capita increases by 80% in the EC and doubles in Region III between 1975 and 
2030; in the Low Scenario, only a moderate increase, by 29% or 37% respectively, occurs. 
On the other hand, the final-energy-to-GDP ratio in the Low Scenario is reduced by about 
50%; notwithstanding the strong increase in the share of electricity, this evolution implies 
a significant reduction in relative energy demand in comparison with past trends, as shown 
in Figure 3.9. 
TABLE 3.11 Summary of final energy demand projections for IIASA/EC and IIASA Region HI, 
1975-2030 (the first value is for the High Scenario, the second for the Low Scenario). 
Final energy (terawatt-
years per year) 
Region III 
IIASA/EC 
(Percentage of 
Region III) 
Electricity share (per-
centage of final energy) 
Region III 
IIASA/EC 
1975 
1.59 
0.91 
57 
13 
11 
1985 
1.96-2.20 
1.05-1.13 
53-52 
14 
14 
2000 
2.39-3.03 
1.17-1.43 
49-47 
17 
17 
2015 
2.74-3.77 
1.27-1.70 
46-45 
19 
19 
2030 
2.99-4.37 
1.38-1.93 
46 -44 
21 
20 
Final energy per capita 
(kilowatts per capita) 
Region III 2.84 3.21-3.59 3.52-4.46 
IIASA/EC 3.53 3.90-4.20 4.09-5.02 
Final-energy-to-GDP ratio 
(watt-years per US 
(1975) dollar) 
Region III 0.67 0.60-0.60 0.54-0.51 
IIASA/EC 0.67 0.59-0.57 0.49-0.45 
3.77-5 16 
4.31-5 78 
0.49-0.43 
0.43-0.38 
3.90-5 70 
4.54-6.35 
0.45-
0.40-
0.37 
0.32 
1975-1985 1985-2000 2000-2015 2015-2030 
Final-energy-to-GDP 
elasticity 
Region III 
IIASA/EC 
0.68-
0.50-
0.77 
0.57 
0.64-0.65 
0.38-0.51 
0.60-0.59 
0.41-0.49 
0.49-0.50 
0.47-0.43 
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3.1.2 The Evolution of Supply 
The disaggregation of the energy supply system of IIASA's Region III into "EC" 
and "Other Region III" has to retain the general characteristics of the energy supply situa­
tion of Region III. In a nutshell, this means that the import dependence of the EC stays 
high in spite of optimistic assumptions about the indigenous production of primary energy. 
Owing to the extended availability of "dirty" fossil fuels at the global level, the "fossil 
era" will extend beyond the year 2030. The disaggregation of IIASA's Region III in terms 
of input data for MESSAGE, together with the input data for the IIASA/EC High and 
Low Scenarios, is described in the Appendix. 
Before the IIASA/EC supply scenarios are specified here in more detail, two points 
concerning the scenario results for Region III and affecting the solution of the MESSAGE 
model for the EC subregion will be discussed. The first point is that the projections of 
indigenous oil supply in Region III were based on early and optimistic assumptions. This 
means that indigenous oil production figures for the period immediately following the 
reference year 1975 are too high, and import requirements now calculated are consequently 
too low for the early time periods of the IIASA/EC scenarios. The second point is that no 
interregional trade in natural uranium was contemplated in the IIASA scenarios. Rather, a 
so­called "area approach" was adopted. In this approach, the potential uranium reserves 
of each region in proportion to the total land area of each of the seven IIASA regions 
were determined. The specific uranium content per unit area was calibrated against Region 
I (North America), which is the best explored of the IIASA world regions. This uranium 
estimation method yields for the EC a total of 770,000 tons of uranium available at a 
cost of up to US(1975)550 per pound. Since this amount falls short of the actual EC 
demand, the most obvious adjustment would have been to assume intraregional trade of 
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natural uranium between the EC and the "rest of the region". In view of the uncertain 
future of global uranium markets, two extreme cases have been considered: (1) adequate 
indigenous reserves of uranium to meet any requirements in MESSAGE; and (2) no indige­
nous supply of uranium whatsoever. Accordingly, in this section two numbers are given in 
each case for the dependence of the EC on energy imports. The first is the import depen­
dence assuming totally indigenous supply of natural uranium; the second (in parentheses) 
is the import dependence under the assumption that all the uranium used in the model is 
imported. 
The dependence on imports as well as the description of the IIASA/EC scenarios in 
terms of the tentative policy goals as described in Crucial Choices f or the Energy Transi­
tion (Commission of the European Communities 1980) are contained in Table 3.12. Case 
Ha (the Acceptable Dependence Case) of Crucial Choices is shown for comparison. 
TABLE 3.12 Compliance of scenarios with tentative policy goals. 
Primary energy in 2030 (per cent) 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Nuclear 
Renewables 
Import dependence (per cent)" 
2000 
2030 
IIASA/EC 
High 
28 
15 
16 
37 
5 
36(52) 
32(40) 
IIASA/EC 
Low 
15 
29 
15 
36 
6 
37(48) 
39(43) 
Acceptable 
Dependence Case 
21 
29 
13 
28 
10 
66 
45 
"The first figure shows the import dependence assuming totally indigenous supply 
of natural uranium; the second (in parentheses) is the import dependence under the 
assumption that all the uranium used in the model is imported. 
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With the exception of the nuclear share in total primary energy, the IIASA/EC 
scenarios meet the tentative policy goals: firstly, an import dependence in the year 2030 
of less than 50%; secondly, a dependence of no more than 30% on any single fuel. The 
absolute quantities behind these relative figures are shown in Figures 3.10—3.12, the 
primary energy supply. The total primary energy supply of the Acceptable Dependence 
Case of Crucial Choices falls about halfway between the IIASA/EC High and Low Scenarios. 
However, this statement only applies for the end of the model study period. In the early 
time periods the primary energy requirements in the EC Case Ha grow even faster than 
those in the IIASA/EC High Scenario, which in turn outgrow the Case IIa primary energy 
supply around the year 2010. The reason for this change is the rather drastic decline in 
economic growth in Case Ha after the year 2000 necessitated by the policy constraints 
described in Crucial Choices. In contrast, the IIASA/EC scenarios exhibit steadier growth 
at the expense of violating the policy constraints. The differences between the scenarios 
with regard to the contribution of each fuel type are explained in the following. 
Oil 
Owing to optimistic estimates of the potential for the fast development of oil pro­
duction within Region III, the allocations for indigenous oil supply in the IIASA/EC 
scenarios are rather high. The import quantities are accordingly lower (Figures 3.13—3.15). 
Toward the fifty­year time horizon, the strain on indigenous oil production will be signif­
icantly higher in the High than in the Low Scenario (i.e. oil in cost category II (see Appen­
dix) is only marginally extracted in the Low Scenario). Furthermore, the cumulative 
availability of oil imports in the IIASA/EC scenarios is higher in the Low Scenario, since 
the reduced energy demand of other world regions will considerably cut back oil imports 
there. In contrast to the HAS A/EC allocations, the EC scenarios have corrected downward 
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the build­up rates for indigenous oil production. The Acceptable Dependence Case (Ha) 
does not fully use all the oil globally produced in the IIASA Low Scenario owing to policy 
variables that limit the dependence of the EC on oil imports. In comparing IIASA/EC with 
EC scenarios, here with Case Ha, it also must be kept in mind that there are differences in 
the definitions of cost categories. 
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Synthetic Liquid Fuels 
In none of the scenarios considered here can the demand for liquid fuels be met by 
crude oil products alone. Coal liquefaction technology was therefore included in the sup­
ply scenarios. The technical process was not specified in detail; the key assumption was 
that of an autothermal process (i.e. a technique in which all energy inputs are in the form 
of coal; this is in contrast to an allothermal technique, which uses process heat from other 
sources for the synthesis) with a conversion efficiency of 60%, at a cost slightly higher 
than US( 1975)520 per barrel of crude oil equivalent, and that will be available from the 
year 2000 onward. In the IIASA/EC scenarios these costs make synthetic liquids slightly 
more expensive than those derived from imported crude oil. In the IIASA/EC High Sce­
nario synthetic liquids amount to an equivalent of 300 million tons of oil (Mtoe) in the 
year 2030, thus contributing 47% to the supply of liquid fuels. For the other two scenar­
ios (IIASA/EC Low and the Acceptable Dependence Case) the corresponding numbers are 
73 (53) Mtoe, corresponding to 11 (12)% of total liquid fuel demand. 
Natural Gas 
The common feature of the scenarios considered in this section is that gas imports 
into the EC are rising quite sharply, even in the IIASA/EC Low Scenario (see Figures 
3.16—3.18). In the global IIASA runs, these imports come from the Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe. As in the case of oil, the greater availability of natural gas imports in the 
Low Scenarios is made use of to relax the strain on indigenous production requirements. 
In Case Ha, the high temperature reactor (HTR) supplies large quantities of gaseous fuels 
(producing only marginal amounts of electricity as a byproduct). In the IIASA/EC scenar­
ios the HTR is not considered explicitly because in these the label FBR (fast breeder reac­
tor) is intended to include all advanced reactors, which is to be interpreted as reactors 
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that make much more efficient use of enriched uranium. Although these advanced 
reactors quite quickly replace the conventional reactors (labeled LWR) consuming enriched 
uranium, the consumption of enriched uranium nearly exhausts the EC's estimated 
ultimately recoverable uranium resources in the IIASA/EC scenarios. This emphasizes the 
importance of the thorium cycle in advanced reactors. 
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Coal 
The significant feature in the curves for coal use (Figures 3.19—3.21) is the double 
peak that occurs in all the scenarios shown. This double peak reflects the two different 
uses of coal in the scenarios. Initially more coal is needed for electricity generation, but 
also, in the long term, coal serves as the carbon input in producing synthetic fuels. A de­
cline and subsequent new rise in coal production and consumption may be economically 
and technically undesirable. This suggests the investigation of an EC Coal Scenario (see 
Section 4) which would be characterized by steadier growth in coal consumption together 
with slower growth in nuclear energy supply. 
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Renewable Energy Sources 
The contributions of renewable energy sources (other than hydropower and geo-
thermal energy, which are considered separately) in the IIASA/EC scenarios in the year 
2030 are 5% (High Scenario) and 6% (Low Scenario). These percentages are in striking 
contrast with Case IIa, in which the corresponding figure is 10%. The high 10% contribu­
tion from renewable soft energy forms had been normatively introduced in Crucial Choices, 
in disregard of prohibitive cost estimates. 
3.2 Discrepancies between the Global and the EC Perspectives 
The five scenarios presented in Crucial Choices were derived on the basis of the 
methodology shown in Figure 2.3, which is itself a modification of Figure 2.1. The driving 
inputs to the model loop, as in the global IIASA scenarios, were the assumed growth rates 
of population and economic activity. Unlike in the IIASA study, the decision criteria 
in Crucial Choices for accepting or rejecting a scenario were based on "energy import 
dependence" and "technological preferences". In order to cross-check the impact of each 
energy supply strategy on the economic environment in the EC scenarios implied by the 
demand calculations, the macroeconomic growth model MACRO was used. This model 
monitors changes in macroeconomic parameters such as investment rates, capital—output 
ratios, labor inputs, or energy—GDP elasticities in accordance with historically observed 
evolutions and/or given (or anticipated) normative changes. The MACRO version imple­
mented for the Crucial Choices analysis contained two distinct blocks: a production 
module of the neoclassical type with capital and labor as the factors of production, and a 
quasi-Keynesian final demand block determining the aggregate levels of private consump­
tion, gross fixed capital formation, exports, and imports. The adaptation of MACRO to 
the job of cross-checking energy strategies was achieved by introducing into this model 
Fueling Europe in the Future 53 
energy import requirements, energy import prices, and specific capital requirements of 
the energy production sector. Straightforwardly applying such a growth model to monitor 
the effect on the economy of a changing energy sector — as was done for the Crucial 
Choices scenarios — has certain disadvantages: this method cannot trace indirect feedback 
effects of rising energy prices on overall economic development; nor can the consistency 
between energy supply and energy demand levels at given energy prices be investigated. 
Furthering the strong energy conservation effects and the resulting low elasticities, detailed 
in Figure 8 of Crucial Choices, suggested just such feedbacks and inconsistencies in price 
effects. The shortcomings of the original MACRO model prompted the development of 
an improved version of MACRO, described in Rogner (1982). 
In the new MACRO version, energy is introduced as a factor of production in the 
aggregate production function. The macroeconomic demand and supply of all three pro­
duction factors — capital, labor, and energy — is balanced by way of their respective market 
prices, in accordance with the underlying production function. 
Applying the new MACRO model to the Crucial Choices scenarios revealed, in the 
case of the Acceptable Dependence Case (Case Ila), some serious inconsistencies, which are 
illustrated in Figure 3.22. On the basis of the energy demand evolution in the Acceptable 
Dependence Case (bottom curve) the equilibrium energy price should have followed the 
top broken curve. Instead, the price development actually according to MESSAGE is 
indicated by the lower broken curve. These discrepancies can be interpreted in the follow­
ing way: the overall energy conservation effects assumed in MEDEE are not consistent 
with the price level of energy on the supply side calculated by MESSAGE. This price level 
would correspond to the expansion in energy demand indicated by the upper solid curve 
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in Figure 3.22. Starting from a level of energy demand and energy prices calculated in the 
Crucial Choices scenarios, the new MACRO model produced notable deviations in the 
evolution of the gross domestic product. More abundant and cheaper energy, of course, 
allowed for higher economic growth rates than a lesser and costlier energy supply (every­
thing else kept constant). Figure 3.23 illustrates the differences in the expansion of GDP 
for the two consistent cases shown in Figure 3.22. 
The inconsistencies revealed by the MACRO test between energy price evolutions 
and GDP or energy consumption evolutions basically reflect an inconsistency in the two 
sets of variables governing the projections of MEDEE and MESSAGE. The projected be­
havior of energy consumers utilizing energy to produce and consume GDP (i.e. what 
MEDEE simulates with the help of technological projections) does not match economically 
with the conditions under which this set of consumers can be supplied with energy 
(i.e. the macroeconomically optimal allocation of resources and supply technologies in 
MESSAGE). Quantitatively this inconsistency cannot be resolved by ruling out the Crucial 
Choices scenarios and preferring instead one or both of the IIASA/EC scenarios described 
in section 3.1. In order to see this, one might compare the GDP evolutions of the Accept­
able Dependence Case (Case Ha) with those of the IIASA/EC High Scenario. The latter 
yields substantially lower GDP evolutions than the former. In line with the findings shown 
in Figures 3.22 and 3.23, however, a reduction of GDP in the Acceptable Dependence 
Case would only result from substantially higher energy costs. In Figure 3.11, the primary 
energy supply system of the IIASA/EC High Scenario, substantially more energy is allocated 
to the EC economy than in Figure 3.12, the Acceptable Dependence Case energy system. 
At least for the period up to 2010, though, the average energy cost level does not differ 
substantially between Figures 3.11 and 3.12 owing to the similar supply pattern of the 
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alternative sources. Thus, within the MACRO logic, the GDP evolution of the IIASA/EC 
High Scenario comes closer to being consistent with the energy demand evolution. Although 
the energy price still seems far too low, macroeconomically speaking, one can conclude 
that there is not enough incentive to bring about the projected level of energy conserva-
tion implied by the Crucial Choices and the IIASA/EC Scenarios. In fact, the energy cost/ 
energy utility inconsistencies outlined lead to the central question of the extent to which 
the energy problem will impede an otherwise feasible economic evolution. This prompts 
the corollary question of whether the energy sector should not be isolated from the rest of 
the economy and stabilized through transfer payments. After all, the technoeconomic 
scenarios of Crucial Choices, as well as the IIASA/EC scenarios, are constrained by the 
volume of energy imports available. At the same time, the exogenously fixed oil reference 
price limits exploitation of alternative more expensive indigenous energy sources. Under 
the "free market" principle for energy, a macroeconomically justified higher energy 
demand sustaining effective use of capital and labor would lead to higher imports; these 
are, however, unavailable. Consequently, the scenarios have normatively fixed high 
conservation rates and, additionally, cutbacks on economic growth. The results of the 
macroeconomic consistency test in section 3.2 illustrate that energy conservation rates 
are not justified at the rates of increase in labor productivity that are still considered 
feasible; basically one could say that conservation and factors supporting GDP growth do 
not match. Under such circumstances, one would certainly consider financing both 
energy conservation and indigenous energy supplies by means of transfer payments from 
the economy, by reinvesting part of the GDP increases realized, thereby supporting the 
additional energy supply potential required to bring about this GDP increment. Whether 
such strategies would be appropriate largely depends on the prospects for further labor 
productivity improvements. In order to explore such a possibility, the use of macroeco-
nomically adapted energy scenarios is indicated. These scenarios primarily have to assess 
the macroeconomic growth potential, recognizing first the scarcity of labor and capital. 
The demand for energy and its macroeconomic substitution price result from the productive 
condition of the economy and can be estimated endogenously. It is obvious that a highly 
productive economy, because of its growth tendencies, would absorb increasing amounts 
of energy even at increasing prices. The endogenous evaluation of energy can, but need 
not necessarily, coincide with the technoeconomic possibilities of adding energy increments 
on the supply side. It is also obvious that this evaluation and the process of clearing 
international energy markets would rank energy differently. A modified, restructured itera-
tive approach to the scenario design appeared necessary in the light of these considerations. 
4 THE ADAPTED SCENARIO SET FOR THE EC 
The economic inconsistencies that emerged between the global and the indigenous 
technical solutions (quantified in the IIASA/EC scenarios and in the EC scenarios of 
Crucial Choices respectively) suggested a modification of the scenario writing procedure. 
The envisaged modification reversed the principal line of thought. Previously the analysis 
started with the specification (in the form of assumptions) of numerous parameters con-
cerning efficiencies, lifestyles, and shifts between economic sectors within the energy 
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demand model MEDEE. In the subsequent energy supply model MESSAGE, similar speci­
fications relating to energy conversion technologies had to be made. The MACRO model 
finally made use of the aggregate of the assumptions in the form of the MEDEE and 
MESSAGE output, including discrepancies of the kind discussed in section 3.2. In section 
4.1 the new approach is presented. This time the analysis starts with MACRO projecting 
overall economic expansion by consistently clearing markets for capital, labor, and energy. 
Labor productivity evolution and labor force participation rates serve as initial inputs in 
this new scenario writing procedure, which results in an Economic Response Scenario (see 
section 4.2). MEDEE translates the aggregate expansion of GDP and equilibrium secondary 
energy demand into sectoral economic activities and final forms of energy (section 4.3), 
thus arriving at the required efficiency improvements, lifestyles, etc. These parameters 
then represent an output rather than an input specification. Finally (section 4.4) MESSAGE 
investigates this Economic Response Scenario with special consideration of the contribu­
tions of nuclear energy and coal to the energy supply system of the EC. 
4.1 The Economic Productivity Approach versus the Energy Demand Approach 
The uncertainty of predicted changes in lifestyles and efficiencies and the difficul­
ties in initiating such changes in a market economy have been major handicaps in long­term 
scenario writing. The new version of MACRO — together with some modifications in the 
sequence of the models — is a step in the direction of disaggregating the uncertainty of 
such changes and their consequences. This is not to say that this new design fully resolves 
the problem of ambiguity, but rather that it adds a new dimension to the analysis and 
thus limits the range of uncertainty. For example, it has not so far been indicated how 
and for what reasons energy conservation efforts will or should penetrate into energy con­
sumption. If one assumes price­induced conservation, discrepancies detailed in section 3.2 
between the energy demand as calculated by MEDEE and the energy price level given by 
MESSAGE may occur. With the newly arranged set of models, this kind of inconsistency 
can essentially be avoided. Furthermore, the new approach has the advantage of using 
MEDEE to interpret the aggregate equilibrium energy demand of MACRO so as to disag­
gregate this energy demand into the corresponding structural changes in the main eco­
nomic sectors and the implications for energy end use with regard to efficiencies, conserva­
tion, etc. The methodological approach was modified according to Figure 4.1. 
— The set of energy models is headed by MACRO, thus replacing the former sce­
nario assumptions on economic growth rates by internally calculated rates. In­
stead, the assumed development of labor productivity has become the essential 
exogenously determined input. 
— Energy import quantities and prices were taken from the global IIASA scenar­
ios, as derived from the identification of the EC region within Region III. 
— MACRO'S output was monitored against the GDP as given by the IIASA/EC 
Low Scenario. Productivity assumptions in MACRO were modified until the 
internally generated GDP growth rates matched those of this Economic Response 
Scenario. 
Start 
Iterations/ 
modifications 
MACRO 
EC 
Energy 
demand 
Energy 
demand 
MESSAGE 
Driving input: ■*— 
labor productivity 
(1) Reduce-
I 
I 
s 
GDP 
Estimates: 
structural evolution of 
sectors from IIASA/EC 
scenarios 
(2) Adjust sectoral 
performace 
MEDEE output 
GDP 
11 ASA/EC Low Scenario 
A d j u s t \ . I 
GDP. 
MACRO demand 
Estimates: 
supply conditions 
11 ASA/EC High Scenario 
Technologies 
I 
Elasticities 
(3) Explore flexibility by 
increasing costs of 
nuclear energy 
Two economic/technical scenarios 
FIGURE 4.1 The process of scenario writing: the macroeconomically derived EC Coal and EC Nuclear Scenarios. 
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— MEDEE takes the aggregate expansion of GDP and secondary energy demand, 
estimating the structural evolution of the main economic sectors and the corre­
sponding efficiency improvements and conservation efforts, as well as the final 
energy demand (quantities and forms of energy). 
— MESSAGE calculates the energy supply and conversion activities consistent 
with the final energy demand of MEDEE and the energy price ceiling provided 
by MACRO. The possible market penetration of domestic energy supplies to­
gether with the reduction of energy imports was the focus of this part of the 
analysis. 
— The loop was closed by feeding energy, capital requirements, and the actual 
import needs for an energy supply strategy back into MACRO. Thus the flexi­
bility gained by introducing higher prices for the domestic energy supply (in 
order to increase domestic investment) and alternatively the drain of resources 
through increased energy imports could be analyzed. 
4.2 Macroeconomic Perspectives 
In the previous section the revised arrangement of the set of energy models was 
introduced. The loop in this configuration begins with MACRO, representing an inner loop 
in its own right. That is to say that before the remaining models MEDEE and MESSAGE 
were included consecutively in the loop, iterations between MACRO and the main driving 
inputs or control variables became necessary in order to define a new Reference Case. As 
already explained in the general outline, the control variable chosen as the most essential 
in this ongoing analysis was labor productivity. Consequently, new projections of this 
exogenously determined variable had to be made. In cooperation with the Directorate 
General XII of the EC Commission, outlooks on the future evolution of labor productivity 
were identified. Figure 4.2 shows the essential variations of labor productivity compared 
with Case Ha of Crucial Choices. In addition to labor productivity, some of the socio­
demographic variables were revised at the same time. The labor force participation rate 
was assumed to drop to 30% by the year 2030 compared with 35% in Case IIa. Such a 
reduction in the potential supply of labor reflects the change in the overall age structure 
of the EC region due to declining population growth rates as well as the effects of antici­
pated improvements in the welfare system, such as earlier rights to retirement pension, or 
the tendency to a shorter working week that has been observed during the past decade. 
All the other exogenously determined variables necessary to run MACRO were transcribed 
directly from Case Ha, including the remaining discrepancies between energy demand and 
equilibrium energy prices explained in section 3.2. Two basically controversial develop­
ments had therefore to be smoothed out. It must be assumed either that the physical 
quantity of energy supplied or that the energy price structure in the original analysis for 
Case Ha is appropriate. In order to evaluate these two paths and eventually to arrive at a 
synthesis, the following subcases were performed: 
(1) The aggregate energy supply was assumed to be identical to that of Case IIa 
and the corresponding new equilibrium price was calculated. 
(2) The equilibrium energy price of Case Ha (see top broken curve in Figure 3.23) 
was taken and the consistent aggregate energy demand was derived. 
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FIGURE 4.2 The change in productivity and labor supply (man-hours per year) assumed in the energy 
models, in comparison with those for Case Ha. 
These two subcases can be summarized as follows: each case was confronted with declin­
ing labor productivity growth rates and a drop in the labor participation rate, thus reduc­
ing the potential labor input (a quasi-index of productivity multiplied by the potential 
labor force and the average number of hours worked per week) to roughly 50% of that of 
Case Ila. A substantial slowdown of economic activity had a priori to be expected. In case 
1 the burden of the retarded productivity growth is mitigated to some extent by the avail­
ability of sufficient energy at prices that hardly differ from today's in real terms. This is 
easily understood on considering various indicators in Tables 4.1-4.3. For example, the 
energy intensity remains on a very high level throughout the planning period. The avail­
ability of sufficient energy at quasi-constant real prices slows down any substitution pro­
cess between energy and other factors of production. Thus energy conservation is not a 
real issue in this case. Economic growth rates, as expected, range considerably lower than 
in Case Ha, owing to not only the low growth in productivity but also the negative trade 
balance. Domestic energy production appears to be less expensive than imported energy. 
However, market penetration constraints restrict the rate of expansion of domestic energy 
production plants. Therefore 45% of total primary energy still has to be imported by 2030. 
In case 2 the higher energy costs have a twofold effect: (1) secondary energy use is 
cut by roughly 27% compared with Case Ha and (2) the level of GDP is reduced even be­
low that of case 1 (see Table 4.1). The capital—output ratio ranges 5% above the value for 
case 1 (3.97). This seems to be not too significant, but the picture is somewhat distorted 
since the major impact on the economy is the reduction in economic activity. If one tries 
to arrive at a quasi-isoquant (the same economic output as in case 1), the substitution of 
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TABLE 4.1 GDP growth rates in Case IIa and subcases 1 and 2. 
GDP growth rate (per cent per year) 
1985­2000 2000­2015 2015­2030 
Casella 4.0 2.5 1.7 
Subcase 1 2.2 1.3 1.2 
Subcase 2 2.0 1.1 0.9 
TABLE 4.2 Relative energy intensity in Case Ha and sub­
cases 1 and 2. 
Case Ha 
Subcase 1 
Subcase 2 
TABLE 4.3 
Subcase 1 
Subcase 2 
Relative energy intensity (1970 = 
1985 2000 2015 
81.5 63.7 53.0 
88.5 84.5 82.6 
80.4 70.2 67.2 
Secondary energy prices in subcases 
Secondary energy prices 
(US(1975) dollars per ton of coal 
1985 2000 2015 
85.1 102.9 105.4 
110.9 150.2 178.7 
100) 
2030 
49.5 
75.2 
63.0 
1 and 2. 
equivalent) 
2030 
107.3 
211.5 
capital for energy pushes the capital—output ratio to 4.25. The effect on labor is insig­
nificant since labor supply is by definition very tight and limits any substitution possibilities. 
However, the absolute level of the real wage rate — or labor income — differs by 6% be­
tween case 1 and case 2. At this point it becomes necessary to create a synthesis of cases 1 
and 2, which is done by taking the average of the energy price growth in cases 1 and 2 
(see Figure 4.3). Furthermore, it is normatively assumed that the energy import ceiling 
and the unit energy import price correspond to those in the IIASA/EC Low Scenario. It 
takes only a few iterations of the inner loop, using MACRO only and monitoring against 
the GDP of the IIASA/EC Low Scenario, to arrive at a converging solution for the Eco­
nomic Response Scenario: that is to say, for economic activity to reach the same absolute 
value of GDP by the year 2030. Only the growth rates in each period follow a slightly dif­
ferent pattern (see Table 4.4). 
The central point of this Economic Response Scenario is to analyze the trade­off 
between energy imports and investments in the domestic energy production sector, and 
the impacts on the structural evolution of the main economic sectors. Thus the output of 
MACRO initiates the iterations of the entire loop including MEDEE and MESSAGE, as 
shown in Figure 4.1. 
The MACRO model is next confronted with two future energy supply paths. One is 
characterized by very favorable capital costs for the nuclear energy production technologies 
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TABLE 4.4 Economic indicators in the Economic Response Scenario. 
GDP growth rates (per cent) 
Relative energy intensity (1970 = 100) 
Secondary energy price (US(1975) 
dollars per ton of coal equivalent) 
1985-
2000 
2.2 
«83 
83-131 
2000-
2015 
1.2 
«74 
131-140 
2015-
2030 
1.1 
«70 
140-160 
(the Nuclear Case), while in the second nuclear energy is considered to fall more in the 
higher investment categories, thus favoring coal technologies (the Coal Case). The loop — 
and especially the MESSAGE model — allocates resources quite differently, but the 
impacts on overall economic development are not significant (see Table 4.5). In the 
Nuclear Case (favorable nuclear capital costs in MESSAGE) the energy import dependence 
is reduced to 28% (cf. 45% in Case Ha, 30% in the Economic Response Scenario), allowing 
the trade balance to remain stable and to range slightly positive. Energy import costs 
roughly double between 1980 and 2030, which is sufficient time for the economy to ad­
just appropriately, especially since initial cutbacks in energy imports occur in the 1980s, 
from about 800 million tons of coal equivalent in 1978 to 625 million tee in 1985. 
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TABLE 4.5 GDP growth rates in the Economic Response Scenario with favorable 
and unfavorable nuclear capital costs. 
GDP growth rate (per cent per year) 
1985­ 2000­ 2015­
2000 2015 2030 
Favorable nuclear capital costs (Nuclear 1.98 1.18 1.11 
Case) 
Unfavorable nuclear capital costs (Coal 
Case) L96 U 2 1.08 
When nuclear investment costs are assumed to fall into higher cost categories, the 
energy import dependence can only be reduced to about 39%, as shown in Figure 4.4(b). 
The higher energy import quantities, however, push the trade balance into the negative 
range (see Figure 4.4(a)). This becomes quite apparent around the turn of the century 
when breeder reactors are delayed owing to cost considerations. The initial trade surplus 
in Figure 4.4 is due to minor inconsistencies between the MACRO model, based on his­
torically estimated parameters and trends, and the MESSAGE model. 
What are the macroeconomic consequences of these two future energy paths? The 
development of the GDP evolves as expected along a middle­of­the­road path between 
the subcases 1 and 2 (see Tables 4.1—4.4.) The cumulative difference in GDP amounts to 
US(1975)$1150 billion, about the amount of the GDP of the EC in 1970. Though small 
in relative terms considered over a period of fifty years, this difference represents an 
absolute amount that should not be neglected. The GDP loss may be put into perspective 
by considering two additional economic indicators: the cumulative loss in the trade 
balance and the cumulative requirements for capital formation within the energy sector. 
Over the next five decades US(1975)$930 billion of additional economic output or 
national income are transferred to the energy­producing countries in the unfavorable 
nuclear capital cost case. This figure contrasts with the cumulative amount of 
US(1975)$120 billion in additional investment required in the EC energy sector in the 
favorable nuclear capital cost case. To put it another way: the increased domestic energy 
production in the case based on lower specific investment costs for nuclear energy can be 
sustained with little greater capital accumulation in the energy sector than is required for 
the high import case with high specific nuclear investment costs. The capital intensity per 
ton of coal equivalent in production capacity is quite significant: $1360 per tee compared 
with $1105 per tee in the favorable nuclear capital cost scenarios (the figure for 1970 was 
$720 per tee). In each scenario, the aggregate energy sector charges against the rest of the 
economy. Since the difference in the absolute amounts of investment needed in the 
domestic energy sector appears to be small (but still $120 billion, corresponding to seven 
times the total investment in energy in 1970)*, any impact on economic development in 
the unfavorable nuclear capital cost scenario must originate from the greater dependence 
on energy imports. 
Σ?922 INV„ = $2140 billion in the favorable nuclear capital cost case, compared with $2020 billion 
in the high import case. 
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FIGURE 4.4 (a) The effect on the trade balance and (b) the dependence on energy imports in the Coal 
Scenario and the Nuclear Scenario. 
The drain on economic resources over the next 50 years in the high import scenario 
amounts to $930 billion, causing an accumulated loss in GDP of the order of $1150 billion 
owing to the increased capital intensiveness of domestic energy needs. The resulting nega-
tive trade balance discourages private businesses from investing. The total investment rate 
drops by one percentage point, from 18.6% to 17.6%. Accumulated, this drop in the invest-
ment rate corresponds to $945 billion in total investment, almost exactly the amount of 
income transferred to the energy-producing countries. 
On aggregate, the favorable nuclear capital cost case implies a more capital-intensive 
economy (owing to the accelerated build-up of an advanced nuclear infrastructure) than 
in the high nuclear capital cost scenario (the Coal Scenario). The output of the economic-
resource- (capital-) consuming energy sector, however, is a high quality product - energy — 
whose internal economic value has been increased through the permanently increasing 
prices of the only alternative (apart from conservation and efficiency improvements): im-
ported energy. 
Macroeconomically, the model runs indicate that the two responses to a tougher 
energy supply situation impede economic growth equally, given the assumed energy prices 
and investment costs. To a first order approximation, neglecting any multiplier and accel-
erator effects of substituting for imports, it makes little difference whether the same 
amount of energy is provided via more costly indigenous investments or via increased 
imports and thus negative trade balances. The very minor deviations in the development 
of the GDP shown in Table 4.5 seem to support this conclusion. 
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4.3 A Consistent Energy Demand Structure 
Following the approach outlined in section 4.1 and illustrated in Figure 4.1, the 
next step in this analysis requires the disaggregation of the GDP expansion calculated by 
MACRO into sectoral activities. The sectoral composition of GDP and its future evolution 
represent the economic structure and the structural change within an economy respectively. 
Structural change and the level of economic activity have to be interpreted as the essential 
driving forces for future energy demand. 
The output of MACRO available to MEDEE concerns the absolute level of aggregate 
demand GDP and its components, i.e. private consumption C, gross fixed capital forma­
tion INV, government expenditure for goods and services G, exports X, and imports M. 
Furthermore, the specific characteristics of the domestic energy sector provide additional 
information for use in MEDEE, such as value added, investment level, capital stock, and 
manpower requirements. Finally, according to the modified methodological approach, 
MACRO'S aggregate equilibrium demand for secondary energy must now be translated 
into sectoral energy conservation efforts, efficiency improvements, etc., by specifying the 
corresponding final energy demand (forms and quantities). 
The Economic Response Scenario, as discussed in section 4.2, provides the quanti­
tative input for the subsequent MEDEE analysis. The GDP grows at the rates shown in 
Table 4.4. For purposes of comparison, Tables 4.6 and 4.7 present the GDP growth rates 
of the Economic Response Scenario and the IIASA/EC High and Low Scenarios, together 
with the projections of other long­term studies. The relative shares of the components of 
GDP are given in Table 4.8 for the years 1975,2000, and 2030. The steady drop in GDP 
growth (to rates far below those observed in the 1950s and 1960s) causes a drop in the 
investment rate from a level ranging between 20.5% and 23% (1960­1975) to a level of 
17.4—18.6% by 2030. The replacement share of investments, however, shows a consider­
ably higher value by the year 2030 of about 78% in the nonenergy sector, compared with 
TABLE 4.6 A comparison of GDP growth rates for the EC. 
Period 
1975­1985 
1985­2000 
2000­2015 
2015­2030 
GDP growth rate (per cent per year) 
IIASA/EC High IIASA/EC Low 
3.8 2.8 
3.2 1.9 
2.4 1.4 
1.9 1.2 
Economic Response 
Scenario defined by MACRO 
3.0 
2.2 
1.2 
1.1 
TABLE 4.7 Average GDP growth rates (per cent per year) for the period 1975­2000 
for the EC compared with growth rates in the Interfutures study. 
Economic Response Scenario 
2.5 
Interfutures 
High (A) 
Moderate (B2) 
North­South Lift (C) 
Protectionist (D) 
4.4 
3.3 
2.0 
3.0 
IIASA/EC Scenarios 
High 3.4 
Low 2.3 
1975 
20.8 
62.5 
14.7 
25.9 
23.5 
2000 
19.6 
64.2 
13.4 
26.9 
24.1 
2030 
18.0 
64.0 
15.3 
27.3 
24.6 
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TABLE 4.8 Evolution of the components of GDP, 1975-2030, for the EC. 
Percentage of total GDP 
Components of GDP° 
INV/GDP 
C/GDP 
G/GDP 
X/GDP 
M/GDP 
aINV, gross fixed capital formation; C, private consumption; G, government ex-
penditures for goods and services; X, exports; M imports. 
51%in 1975. In other words, net investment as a percentage of GDP drops from 10.1% to 
4%. This reduction in net investment can be interpreted as a shift in economic activity 
from heavy industries to service-oriented activities. This certainly influences the distribu-
tion of value added over the economic sectors in MEDEE, as is shown later. The decline in 
investment is offset by increased private and public spending, while exports and imports 
increase to 1.1% and 1.4% greater shares of the total GDP respectively. 
Tables 4.4 and 4.8 set the aggregate economic frame for the sectoral disaggregation 
of economic activities. Since MACRO calculates value added and other parameters of the 
energy sector, the MACRO output serves as direct input to MEDEE. The absolute level of 
value added for the energy sector is affected by the degree of energy import dependence. 
The oil import ceiling in the Economic Response Scenario was taken from the IIASA/EC 
High Scenario. This choice suggested itself since the aggregate demand for secondary 
energy fell halfway between the levels in the IIASA/EC High Scenario and the IIASA/EC 
Low Scenario. The macroeconomic reasons for the high energy intensity of the Economic 
Response Scenario, which seemingly combines the low economic growth of the IIASA/EC 
Low Scenario with an energy allocation (aggregate secondary energy consumption) closer 
to thatofthe IIASA/EC High Scenario,have been given in section3.2. As the import ceiling 
for oil is set very low, the domestic energy sector has to raise its production level accord-
ingly. In the Economic Response Scenario the energy import dependence dropped to 
about 30% by 2030. The considerably higher domestic energy production increased the 
share of value added generated by the energy sector from the present figure of about 4% 
to more than 7%. 
The evolution of the GDP shares of all the other economic sectors represented in 
MEDEE has to be extrapolated on the basis of historical trends and anticipated structural 
changes, some of which depend directly on the level of aggregate economic growth rates 
(e.g. the trend to more service-oriented activities and less heavy industry). Between 1960 
and 1977, although a relatively short period in comparison with the fifty-year study 
period, some notable changes in the GDP formation of the EC were observed. According 
to Table 4.9, the agricultural sector and the construction sector followed a downward 
trend that was mainly compensated by the augmented shares of industry and trade. In the 
light of retarded investment rates and productivity growth rates and the declining labor 
force participation rate, the shifts in the generation of GDP were assumed to be as shown 
in Table 4.10. 
os 
TABLE 4.9 GDP contribution of the EC's main economic sectors (per cent), 1960-1977 (at constant 1975 prices and exchange rates). 
Year 
1960 
1963 
1965 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
Source 
Relative GDP 
(1975 = 
55 
63 
70 
88 
91 
94 
100 
102 
100 
105 
107 
= 100) 
Relative GDP per capita 
(1975 = 
61 
68 
74 
90 
93 
95 
101 
102 
100 
105 
107 
: United Nations (1978). 
= 100) 
Percentage 
Agriculture 
6.5 
5.9 
5.6 
5.1 
5.0 
4.7 
4.8 
4.8 
4.7 
4.3 
4.4 
of GDP by economic sector 
Industry 
33.7 
34.1 
34.6 
36.6 
36.5 
36.4 
37.1 
36.9 
35.9 
36.9 
37.6 
Manufacturing 
industry 
28.5 
29.1 
30.5 
33.1 
32.7 
32.9 
33.5 
33.6 
31.8 
32.7 
32.5 
Construction 
8.6 
8.8 
9.2 
8.9 
8.9 
8.9 
8.5 
8.1 
7.9 
7.5 
7.3 
Trade 
11.6 
12.0 
12.1 
12.4 
12.5 
12.4 
12.4 
12.4 
12.4 
12.4 
12.1 
Transportation 
and communication 
6.4 
6.4 
6.4 
6.6 
6.6 
6.7 
6.6 
6 8 
6.7 
6.7 
6.7 
Other 
33.2 
32.8 
32.1 
30.5 
30.5 
30.8 
30.5 
31.0 
32.4 
32.1 
31.9 
■5 
£ 
2* 
^ 
1 
u 
ju i: 
S3 
o 
t-
I 2 
a· 
B. 
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A pronounced shift to the service sector at the expense of the mining and manufac-
turing sector is the most notable assumption. The shares of agriculture and construction 
continue to decline at historically observed rates. The internal structure of manufacturing 
shows a reduction in the share of basic materials and a higher contribution from machinery 
and equipment. This runs counter to past trends toward decreasing shares for the so-called 
light manufacturing industries (mostly nondurable or semidurable consumer goods) (see 
Table 4.11). Within manufacturing these dechning shares had been offset by faster growth 
in heavy manufacturing, chemicals, and metal products. The outputs of these subsectors, 
however, are essentially investment goods. In the light of modest GDP growth rates and 
TABLE 4.10 Anticipated shifts in the contribu-
tions of the EC's economic sectors to the GDP. 
Sector 
Agriculture 
Construction 
Mining and manufacturing 
Energy 
Services 
Basic materials 
Machinery and equipment 
Nondurables 
Percentage con-
tribution to GDP 
1975 
4.7 
7.9 
31.8 
4.1 
51.5 
30.0 
37.0 
33.0 
2030 
3.2 
7.0 
25.6 
7.2 
57.0 
28.7 
38.3 
33.0 
TABLE 4.11 The distribution of the EC's industrial production by sectors, 1960-1977. 
Sector 
Percentage of total industrial production, by year 
1960 1963 1968 1970 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 
Relative total industrial produc-
tion (1970 = 100) 63 71 88 100 115 116 108 116 118 
Mining/drilling 
Coal 
OU 
Metals 
Manufacturing 
Light manufacturing 
Food etc. 
Textiles and apparel 
Wood products 
Paper, printing, and publishing 
Heavy manufacturing 
Chemicals, petroleum, 
Nonmetals, mining pre 
Basic metals 
Metal products 
etc. 
iducts 
6.2 
5.2 
0.2 
0.2 
88.5 
34.7 
11.0 
12.0 
3.6 
5.6 
55.0 
8.4 
3.8 
9.0 
34.2 
4.1 
2.3 
0.4 
0.2 
89.3 
30.4 
10.0 
8.6 
3.5 
5.7 
58.9 
12.0 
3.8 
7.9 
35.7 
3.5 
1.6 
0.6 
0.2 
88.1 
29.8 
10.6 
8.1 
3.6 
5.1 
58.3 
12.6 
3.7 
6.8 
36.2 
3.4 
1.3 
0.7 
0.1 
88.2 
29.9 
10.0 
7.6 
3.7 
5.3 
58.3 
13.4 
3.7 
6.6 
35.6 
Electricity, gas, water 5.3 6.6 8.4 8.4 
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the drop in the investment rate, accelerated growth in heavy manufacturing and metal 
products seems unlikely. On the other hand, the output of light manufacturing will most 
probably not continue to lose its market share. The increased output of electronics equip-
ment, communications equipment, etc., will reverse this past trend in the decades to come. 
After identifying the expansion of various economic sectors and the implications 
for the structural composition of the GDP, the next step is the evaluation of an energy 
demand structure consistent with both the composition of the GDP in MEDEE and the 
equilibrium energy demand provided by MACRO. This requires the specification of energy 
efficiency improvements, lifestyle changes, penetration rates, and other indicators. 
In the wake of low economic growth and reduced investment rates, technical pro-
gress, especially improvements in energy efficiency, is likely to remain rather modest. 
Within the manufacturing sector, the electrical energy intensity is assumed to decrease by 
0.17% per year while the improvement in thermal energy intensity amounts to 0.47% an-
nually. 
With the further slow trend to electricity in thermal uses (10% above present day 
levels by 2030), the moderate growth of district heating (11% of steam and hot water by 
2030) and soft solar energy (12% of low temperature steam and hot water by 2030), and 
gradual improvements in the efficiency of fossil fuel use, the final energy intensity in 
manufacturing industries declines in this scenario by 0.55% per year. This is very low 
compared with the figures for the period 1960—1976, when the rate of decline was 2.2% 
per year in the EC, 2.7% per year in the US and in Japan, and 2.2% per year for all OECD 
countries together. On the other hand, this was a period of high growth (manufacturing 
value added in the EC grew at a rate of 3.8% annually) compounded with a rapidly 
changing product mix. In addition, the introduction of new equipment together with the 
rapid substitution of oil and gas for coal in the past twenty years greatly enhanced the 
efficiency of energy use in manufacturing. These improvements were not primarily 
due to special efforts to economize on energy but rather resulted from technical progress 
in general; the prospects for further improvements seem rather limited given the trend to 
a stagnant economy with the low investment rates outlined by the MACRO model. 
With regard to freight transportation (excluding pipelines), it is assumed that the 
total number of ton-kilometers will increase by a factor of 2.5 between 1975 and 2030, 
in parallel with the growth in the value added for nonservice sectors. In the absence of 
any changes in the modal breakdown or intensity improvements, motor fuel demand for 
freight transportation increases by the same factor. In fact, a more realistic assumption 
would be a moderate further shift from railways to road transportation and a reduction in 
the energy intensities of various modes; the net effect would be that the average energy 
intensity over all modes of freight transportation would be fairly constant, since the two 
trends counteract each other. The performance of trucks especially should be expected to 
improve with increased pressure from fuel prices. But besides vehicle performance, the 
average energy intensity will be significantly influenced by capacity utilization, traffic 
conditions, and the proportion of long-distance to short-distance hauls. 
Motor fuel consumption for international and military transportation, which was 
estimated to be approximately 5% of total motor fuel consumption in 1975, increases by 
a factor of 2.6 between 1975 and 2030 in the Economic Response Scenario, accounting 
for about 7% of motor fuel consumption in 2030. This end-use category is assumed to 
grow in parallel with the GDP. 
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Energy consumption for passenger transportation was estimated to account for 
about 70% of total motor fuel consumption and about 50% of electricity consumption 
for transportation in 1975. With motor fuel consumption growing by a factor of 1.9 and 
electricity for transportation by a factor of nine between 1975 and 2030 in this scenario, 
passenger transportation would account for 65% of total motor fuel consumption and 
76% of electricity consumption for transportation in 2030. The rapid growth in electri-
city use is mostly due to the assumption that by 2030 about 20% of urban cars will be 
electric. The underlying assumptions concerning the increase in passenger travel are sum-
marized in Table 4.12. 
TABLE 4.12 Assumed increase in EC passenger transportation, 1975-2030. 
1975 
Car ownership per 1000 population 
Total passenger-kilometers by car 
Total passenger-kilometers by public transport 
Plane travel as a percentage of total passenger-
kilometers by public transport 
2030 
270 
2 X 1012 
0.45 X 10'2 
400 
4X 1012 
2.2 X 1012 
6% 18% 
TABLE 4.13 Assumed changes in EC energy use in the household and service sector, 1975-2030. 
Households 
Population 
Persons per household 
Dwellings 
Useful energy consumption" 
Space heating 
Water heating 
Cooking 
Air conditioning 
Electrical appliances 
TOTAL 
Consumption per dwelling 
Useful 
Final 
Service sector 
Floor area 
Useful energy consumption" 
Thermal uses 
Air conditioning 
Specific electricity requirements 
TOTAL 
Consumption per 100 m2 
Useful 
Final 
1975 
258 million 
3 
85.8 million 
138 GWyr (77%) 
19 GWyr (11%) 
8 GWyr (4%) 
15 GWyr (8%) 
180 GWyr (100%) 
18,000 kWh 
25,000 kWh 
17.5 X 10" m2 
42 GWyr (74%) 
1 GWyr (1%) 
14 GWyr (25%) 
57 GWyr (100%) 
28,000 kWh 
37,000 kWh 
2030 
290 million 
2.3 
126 million 
245 GWyr (65%) 
50 GWyr (13%) 
12 GWyr (3%) 
3 GWyr (1%) 
65 GWyr (17%) 
375 GWyr (100%) 
26,000 kWh 
32,000 kWh 
27.8 X 108 m2 
57 GWyr (61%) 
5 GWyr (6%) 
31 GWyr (33%) 
93 GWyr (100%) 
29,000 kWh 
35,000 kWh 
Percentage change, 
1975-2030 
+ 12% 
+ 47% 
+ 108% 
+ 50% 
+ 63% 
Note: GWyr: gigawatt-year (10' watt-years); kWh: kilowatt-hour. 
"Equivalent electricity requirements. 
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Reductions in energy intensity are assumed to occur mainly in cars (30% lower in 
2030 than in 1975) and in planes (12% lower), but not in other modes of public transport 
owing to reduced load factors and limited scope for improvements in vehicle performance. 
Energy use in dwellings and service sector buildings accounts presently for about 
35% of total final energy consumption. In the Economic Response Scenario this share 
remains almost constant throughout the study period. The detailed assumptions are 
summarized in Table 4.13. 
The increasing demand for space heating results mainly from the assumed shift to 
central heating (in 2030 in the Low Scenario only 6% of the total housing stock is without 
central heating, compared with more than 50% in 1975) and from the larger size of new 
dwellings, which has a greater effect than the reduction of heat loss by 20—25%. The 
major growth areas, however, are assumed to be electrical appliance use and water heating. 
In the service sector, growth in thermal energy use is in parallel with the growth in 
floor area, assuming that more widespread heating in new buildings offsets energy savings 
due to improvements in insulation. Again, the major growth item is assumed to be specific 
electricity requirements. 
On comparing again the two cases (IIASA/EC Low Scenario and the Economic 
Response Scenario) in Figures 4.5 and 4.6, we observe that the differences are mainly in 
the projections of energy use for transportation and in buildings. This becomes even clearer 
when we look at the energy intensities of the various sectors, which are summarized in 
Table 4.14 in order to give an aggregate characterization of each scenario. 
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TABLE 4.14 A comparison of final energy demand statistics for the EC. 
Population (millions) 
GDP per capita (thousand US(1975) dollars) 
Final energy per capita (kilowatts) 
Electricity per capita (kilowatts) 
Final energy per unit GDP (watts per US 
(1975) dollar) 
Manufacturing 
Final energy per unit value added (watts per 
USÜ975) dollar) 
Freight transportation 
Final energy per ton-kilometer (kilowatt-
hours thermal) 
Passenger transportation 
Final energy per passenger-kilometer (kilowatt-
hours thermal) 
Households 
Final energy per dwelling (thousand kilowatt-
hours) 
Service sector 
Final energy per 100 square meters floor area 
(thousand kilowatt-hours) 
1975 
(base year) 
258 
5.25 
3.5 
0.4 
0.67 
1.00 
0.552 
0.424 
25.5 
37.2 
2030 
IIASA/EC 
High 
304 
19.8 
6.4 
1.3 
0.32 
0.60 
0.438 
0.330 
26.7 
27.3 
Low 
304 
11.5 
4.5 
0.9 
0.40 
0.66 
0.438 
0.277 
23.6 
24.8 
Economic Response 
Scenario 
290 
12.4 
5.7 
1.1 
0.46 
0.74 
0.552 
0.335 
31.9 
34.6 
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It should be recalled that the Economic Response Scenario outlined earlier is an 
illustration that indicates what set of detailed assumptions about the evolution of energy 
demand in various sectors would be "consistent" with the aggregate evolution of the eco­
nomy in general, and with energy demand and energy prices, as calculated by the MACRO 
model, in particular. Clearly there can be no unique set of such assumptions; but the fore­
going attempt demonstrates how macroeconomically balanced energy use would translate 
into reasonable sectoral conservation efforts. The conclusions to be drawn are as follows. 
• The straightforward technical energy demand projections, based on a consider­
ation of the technical potential for energy conservation and the saturation of 
certain energy demand categories in the "consumptive" sectors of the economy 
(passenger transportation, household and service sector), as in the scenarios for 
Region III and by analogy for the EC, clearly tend to be lower than projections 
resulting from a macroeconomic model. 
• There is a danger in the bottom­up scenario approach, using MEDEE­2 as the 
initial model in a scenario writing sequence, of accumulating trends in one dir­
ection, while in reality these trends could be offset by others that are not antic­
ipated. 
• The MACRO model — although it offers the advantage of formal consistency 
on an aggregate level within the idealization of an equilibrium between energy, 
capital, and labor ­suggests that energy demand is solely affected by the energy 
price, which may be overstated, since the parameter estimates are based on a 
relatively short period (1960—1978) in which the aggregate energy elasticity 
was approximately equal to unity. The energy/output elasticity in industry 
used to be significantly less than unity and the energy/income elasticity of 
households significantly greater than unity; this latter figure should decline if 
saturation effects occur. This deficiency, however, is partially offset by the con­
stant elasticity of substitution production function, where the estimated elastici­
ty of substitution tends to the more optimistic (higher) side. The secondary 
energy—GDP elasticity for the years 2015­2030 dropped to 0.67, compared 
with 1.06 for the period 1960­1970. 
4.4 Supply Flexibility: Coal versus Nuclear Energy 
The design of the Economic Response scenario yielded — under the given assump­
tions quite naturally — a low economic growth scenario. This new scenario provided the 
opportunity for an investigation of the flexibility in primary energy supply. This flexibility 
arose when the supply constraints of the IIASA/EC High Scenario were combined with 
the relatively low demand figures that were specified in detail by the new MEDEE­2 runs. 
The wider choice that resulted from this combination was explored by describing two 
supply alternatives: a Coal Scenario and a Nuclear Scenario. 
Both supply scenarios (Nuclear and Coal), viewed from the input side of the energy 
supply model MESSAGE, are most significantly characterized by the reduction of total 
secondary energy demand in 2030 by 16% from the level in the IIASA/EC High Scenario, 
which was based on a disaggregation of IIASA's High Scenario for world Region III (OECD 
countries excluding North America). 
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A comparison with the Acceptable Dependence Case — Case IIa in Crucial Choices 
— shows that total secondary energy demand in the Economic Response Scenario is 7% 
lower in 2030. For the year 2000 the same comparison shows a level 17% lower for the 
Economic Response Scenario. These remarkable differences at two points of time indi­
cate that the Acceptable Dependence Case combined high growth in the earlier period 
(reflecting the high economic growth desired politically) with a precipitous decline in 
growth rates after the year 2000 (induced by taking into consideration long­term policy 
goals). Characterized in similar terms, the alternative supply scenarios (Coal, Nuclear, and 
Economic Response Scenarios) try to combine these two aspects (growth aspirations and 
policy goals) throughout the time horizon. 
The assumptions on energy supply constraints in the Nuclear Scenario and the Coal 
Scenario remained basically unchanged from those in the IIASA/EC High Scenario (see 
the description of the data in the Appendix). The only difference is the adjustment of the 
oil supply constraints. The maxima for indigenous oil production, which had been based 
on early and very optimistic assumptions on IIASA's part, were reduced to more realistic 
levels for the first twenty­five years of the time horizon. Accordingly, the constraints for 
oil imports were relaxed to compensate for the reduction in indigenous supply. 
Reducing demand while maintaining supply opportunities naturally broadens the 
choice of energy supply strategies. This is clearly demonstrated by the coal balance of the 
Nuclear Scenario (Figure 4.7). This figure shows a substantial drop in total coal consump­
tion around 2000 to 2010, indicating the potential for additional supply. It also demon­
strates the double role coal plays in the future energy supply: its near­term role is increas­
ingly to provide the input for electricity generation until enough nuclear capacity is avail­
able to meet electricity demand (Figure 4.8). The second, long­term role is to provide the 
raw material for the production of synthetic liquid fuels which increasingly replace im­
ports of crude oil (Figure 4.9). 
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The great unexploited potential for coal supply in the Nuclear Scenario led to the 
formulation of an alternative scenario in which coal, assumed to be abundant, was used 
more widely, to allow a more limited introduction of nuclear power and in particular a 
delay in the deployment of advanced reactors. The means of achieving this delay in the 
supply scenario was a doubling of capital requirements for the installation of nuclear 
power plants, which reversed the positions of coal and nuclear power in the preference 
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ranking established by the supply model on the basis of cost figures. Figures 4.10—4.12 
show the results of the Coal Scenario. According to these figures nuclear energy plays the 
role of a "stand­by" energy carrier filling the gap that remains between electricity supply 
and demand after coal is used to meet direct demands, i.e. for replacing crude oil imports 
and for generating electricity. The introduction of advanced nuclear reactors is accordingly 
delayed beyond the model's planning horizon. 
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The essential differences between the Coal Scenario and the Nuclear Scenario with 
respect to the consumption of natural uranium are presented in Figures 4.13 and 4.14. 
Contrary to what might have been expected, the consumption of natural uranium is slightly 
higher in the Coal Scenario than in the Nuclear Scenario. The reason for this is the delay 
in commissioning fast breeder reactors and the consequent higher utilization of light water 
reactors. The categories of uranium underlying these figures refer to the two cost categories 
US(1975)530 per pound of U3Og ($80 per kilogram of uranium) and $50 per pound of 
U 3 0 8 ($130 per kilogram of uranium). In the IIASA/EC High Scenario no imports of 
uranium are projected in view of the so­called area approach in the IIASA scenarios 
(see the description in section 3.1). 
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An evaluation of the two supply scenarios in terms of the tentative policy goals (to 
maintain upper limits on import dependence and to limit the dependence on any single 
primary energy source) described in Crucial Choices is shown in Table 4.15. Because of 
the unspecified origin of the supply of natural uranium (imported or indigenously pro­
duced), Table 4.15 contains two figures for the import dependence in 2030. For the lower 
figure it is assumed that all natural uranium in 2030 is indigenously produced, and for the 
higher that all the uranium consumed in this year is imported. This clearly affirms the 
important role to be played by advanced reactors if energy self­sufficiency becomes a 
prime policy goal. The other feature of Table 4.15 is the virtually interchanged figures for 
coal and nuclear energy as primary energy suppliers. These two scenarios can be regarded 
as two extremes between which the path of future development can be chosen. It must be 
stressed, however, that for many reasons the actual room for maneuver may be much 
smaller. In particular, all constraints on primary energy availability have been copied 
from the IIASA/EC High Scenario — a consistent world energy trade scenario resting on 
the basic assumption of free cost­dependent access to global energy resources. Develop­
ments since 1975 have not vindicated this assumption: countries have limited their oil 
and gas production in view of their own long­term needs. 
TABLE 4.15 Scenario results in comparison with tentative policy goals. 
Coal Case 
Nuclear Case 
Primary energy sources in 2030 (per cent) 
Coal Oil Gas Nuclear 
35 19 20 21 
23 19 20 34 
Renewables 
4 
4 
Import dep 
(per cent) 
2000 
42 (50) 
32(51) 
sndence0 
2030 
40(61) 
28 (33) 
"For the first figure, all natural uranium consumed is assumed to be indigenously produced; for the 
figure in parentheses, all natural uranium consumed is assumed to be imported. 
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On consideration of these two supply scenarios one might form the impression that 
coal and nuclear energy are the only major alternatives for energy supply over the next 
fifty years. Although the decision between high coal/low nuclear and low coal/high nucle­
ar is a very important one, requiring commitments and adjustments well in advance of 
implementation, other alternatives must be kept in view. Among these are the liquefac­
tion of natural gas (including its transportation over large distances) and the production 
of synthetic liquid fuels with the help of nuclear process heat. Beyond the time horizon 
of the scenarios considered here there are yet more options to be considered, such as nu­
clear fusion and centralized solar energy. Within the next fifty years, however, significant 
contributions are not to be expected from these latter sources. 
5 ASSESSMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The analytical process described in the preceding sections emphasizes that an opti­
mal energy strategy cannot be formulated for the European energy sector by isolating the 
European energy problem and designing technical or technoeconomic solutions. The sce­
narios developed in the earlier EC study Crucial Choices for the Energy Transition ex­
plore the range of normatively defined conservation and supply strategies. The Crucial 
Choices scenarios for the EC neglect quantitative feedbacks originating from other world 
regions also trying to deal with the worldwide energy problem. This could be corrected 
in an early phase of this study by taking account of the findings of the comprehensive 
study Energy in a Finite World by IIASA's Energy Systems Program. The effect, not sur­
prisingly, is a substantial reduction in the economic growth projected for the EC. Figure 
5.1 puts the various growth paths of the Crucial Choices study and of the present study 
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into perspective. The two new scenarios IIASA/EC High and IIASA/EC Low embrace a 
range of GDP figures, falling short of the range explored in Crucial Choices by about 25% 
around the year 2030. 
An independent investigation of the European energy problem has added to the 
technologically oriented strategies a macroeconomically consistent strategy for the EC 
energy system. The underlying idea was to postulate equilibrium conditions for the sub­
stitution of capital and labor for energy. Given the high productivity of capital and labor, 
all technically oriented energy strategies imply a degree of energy conservation and sub­
stitution away from oil that does not appear to be justified at the price level characteristic 
of the global supply opportunities. 
Here a word of caution is appropriate. The adjusted global supply opportunities rest 
on the basic assumption of a cooperating world, a particular feature of the IIASA scenarios 
and thus also of the IIASA/EC High and IIASA/EC Low scenarios. In other words, the 
scenarios anticipate no new cartel­type supply organizations that might raise export prices 
for energy substantially above the cost price levels used for all non­oil energy trade in the 
scenario calculations. 
Because of this internal macroeconomic inconsistency of all five Crucial Choices 
scenarios and the two IIASA/EC scenarios in Figure 5.1, a further macroeconomically 
consistent scenario was finally specified. It combines the GDP evolution of the IIASA/EC 
Low Scenario and the supply opportunities quantified with the IIASA/EC High Scenario. 
As an immediate consequence a technical option opens up in an otherwise extremely con­
strained supply situation of choosing between energy technologies that would suit other 
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objectives, e.g. social or environmental preferences. This flexibility is exemplified by the 
two scenarios labeled Coal Scenario and Nuclear Scenario. 
The variations in oil imports, total coal consumption, and total installed nuclear 
capacity for all the scenarios in Figure 5.1 are given in Figures 5.2—5.4. 
The nine scenarios can be seen as efforts to adapt the European energy system by 
technological change to an optimistically assessed global energy problem, conforming as 
closely as possible to a self-regulating macroeconomic optimization principle that ties the 
economic value of energy to the level of productivity of capital and labor: high capital 
and labor productivity require high energy prices to secure substantial energy conservation. 
At this point a reassessment of the basic objectives behind each particular energy 
strategy or for that matter the assumptions behind each scenario becomes necessary. This 
reassessment must concentrate on the broader impacts of adopting a particular technolog-
ical strategy. The question arises whether a reduction of an average unit of energy achieved 
in the scenarios of Figure 5.1 justifies a calculated loss of GDP on average five times 
larger than the economic value of the energy unit saved. A corollary question resulting 
from this study is whether price equilibria between capital, labor, and energy can and 
should be achieved in the future European economic system. 
Clearly, the answers to such questions cannot be found by analyzing the potential 
role of alternative technological strategies in the energy system of the European Com-
munities. The analysis illustrates, however, that whatever these answers are, they will have 
a decisive influence on the role particular energy technologies can play in Europe in the 
future. 
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APPENDIX 
The MESSAGE Model 
Introduction 
The fundamental features of the MESSAGE model are summarized in Figure A.l. 
A number of primary energy sources and conversion technologies are considered. These 
include resources and technologies that could permit an essentially unlimited supply of 
energy — the fundamental point of the modeling being to explore possible transitions to 
energy system states based on more or less unlimited resources, such as thorium-232, 
uranium-238, and solar energy. 
Resources 
(indigenous 
and imported) 
Crude oil 
Coal 
Natural gas 
Uranium 
Hydro 
Solar 
Geothermal 
Other 
1 
r 
Conversion 
Electric power plants 
Coupled production of 
heat and electricity 
Refineries 
Synthetic fuel plants 
Others 
1 r 
— » 
Secondary 
energy demand 
Electricity 
Liquid fuels 
Gaseous fuels 
Coal 
Soft solar 
District heat 
1 ' 
Environment 
I 
FIGURE A.l Projection of useful and final energy demand in MEDEE-2. 
Each primary energy source (except solar energy and hydroelectric power) is sub-
divided into an optional (chosen by the model user) number of classes in MESSAGE, 
taking account of the cost of extraction, the quality of resources, and the location of 
deposits. These primary sources are then converted directly (e.g. by crude oil refining) or 
indirectly (e.g. electrolytic hydrogen) into secondary energy. Secondary energy is exoge-
nous to MESSAGE; data are provided via the MEDEE-2 model as time series data for elec-
tricity, soft solar energy, and solid, liquid, and gaseous fuels. 
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The variables of the model are expressed in period averages of annual quantities. 
The objective function is the sum of discounted costs for fuels (primary energy), 
operation and maintenance, and capital costs for providing the energy demand over the 
time horizon for the study (1980­2030). 
In the equations of the model — given approximately below — indices are some­
times omitted if this seems to facilitate understanding. 
A comprehensive description of the MESSAGE model — its logic, mathematics, and 
scope — is available in Schrattenholzer (1981). 
1 Inputs to the MESSAGE Model 
This section describes the input data to the MESSAGE model for the IIASA/EC 
High and Low, EC Coal, and EC Nuclear scenarios (denoted as Case H, Case L, Case C, 
and Case Ν in what follows). 
These data are compared with the EC data for one of the "bottom­up" runs described 
in Crucial Choices, namely the Acceptable Dependence Case (Case IIa). In some cases 
results (output data of MESSAGE) are reported so as to allow for better judgment of the 
input data. 
All cost figures are in 1975 US dollars. 
1.1 Data on Primary Energy Supply 
1.1.1 Coal 
Total availability: Cases H, L, C, and Ν 
Category I ($33/kWyr): 55 TWyr* 
Category II ($54/kWyr): 100 TWyr 
Total availability: Casella 
Category I ($35/kWyr): 65 TWyr 
The actual usage in the scenarios is as shown in Table A.l. 
TABLE A.l Coal usage in the scenarios. 
Case Η 
Case L 
Case C 
Case Ν 
Case Ha 
Category I (TWyr) 
19.8 
16.7 
19.8 
17.7 
12.0 
Category II (TWyr) 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
The maximum annual extraction for all indigenous categories together is as shown 
in Table A.2. As mentioned in the main text, the extraction constraints have the same 
upper limits in all four IIASA scenarios. 
The maximum annual coal imports are given in Table A.3. 
*kWyr, kilowatt­year; TWyr, terawatt­year (10n watt­years). 
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TABLE A.2 Maximum annual coal extraction in the 
scenarios for all indigenous categories together. 
Year Cases H.C.N.L (GWyr)° Case Ha (GWyr) 
290 
290 
290 
290 
290 
290 
290 
290 
290 
290 
290 
aGWyr:gigawatt-year (10' watt-years). 
TABLE A.3 Maximum annual coal imports in the scenarios. 
Year Cases H, C, and N (GWyr) Case L (GWyr) Case Ha (GWyr) 
1980 
1985 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2005 
2010 
2015 
2020 
2025 
2030 
270 
300 
320 
340 
360 
375 
390 
400 
400 
400 
400 
1980 
1985 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2005 
2010 
2015 
2020 
2025 
2030 
40 
105 
140 
150 
170 
205 
215 
230 
260 
300 
470 
40 
80 
110 
110 
100 
60 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
85 
100 
115 
132 
150 
170 
191 
210 
226 
238 
250 
Costs: Cases H, L, C, and N: $36/kWyr (constant); Case Ha: $45/kWyr 
(1980) rising to $50/kWyr (1990 and thereafter). 
1.1.2 Oil 
Total availability: Cases H,L,C, and N 
Category I ($62/kWyr « $12/barrel): 10.5 TWyr 
Category II ($103/kWyr « $20/barrel): 2.0 TWyr 
Category III ($129/kWyr « $25/barrel): 12.0 TWyr 
Total availability: Case Ha 
Category I ($43/kWyr « $83/barrel): 4.6 TWyr 
Category II ($75/kWyr * $14.6/barrel): 6.8 TWyr 
The actual oil usage in the scenarios is as given in Table A.4. As stated in the main 
text, the oil production figures for the IIASA High and Low scenarios were overly optim-
istic. They were adjusted in the Coal and Nuclear scenarios, resulting in a lower total con-
sumption in these cases. 
The maximum annual extraction for all indigenous categories together is as given in 
Table A.5. 
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TABLE A.4 Oil usage in the scenarios. 
Category I (TWyr) Category II (TWyr) Category III (TWyr) 
Case Η 
Case L 
Case C 
Case Ν 
Case IIa 
10.5 
10.5 
9.8 
9.8 
4.6 
2.0 
0.25 
0 
0 
4.0 
TABLE A.5 Maximum annual oil extraction in the scenarios for all indigenous categories 
together. 
Year Cases C and Ν (GWyr) Case Η (GWyr) Case L (GWyr) Case Ha (GWyr) 
1980 
1985 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2005 
2010 
2015 
2020 
2025 
2030 
120 
160 
180 
190 
200 
210 
200 
180 
150 
180 
185 
290 
310 
300 
270 
240 
210 
200 
180 
150 
180 
185 
290 
310 
300 
265 
235 
200 
175 
145 
115 
77 
50 
120 
160 
180 
190 
190 
190 
180 
165 
150 
115 
80 
Costs: Cases H, C, N: $69/kWyr (1980); $106/kWyr (1990 and thereafter). Case L: $67/ 
kWyr (1980), gradually increasing to $140/kWyr (2030). 
As can be seen from this comparison, the extraction constraints in Cases C and Ν 
are a combination of the figure for Case Η and those for Case Ha. 
The maximum annual oil imports are given in Table A.6. 
Since the limits on indigenous oil production were lowered in cases C and Ν (in 
comparison with case H), the constraints on oil imports were increased accordingly. 
TABLE A.6 Maximum annual oil imports in the scenarios. 
Year Cases C and Ν (GWyr) Case Η (GWyr) Case Ha (GWyr) Case L (GWyr) 
1980 
1985 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2005 
2010 
2015 
2020 
2025 
2030 
660 
695 
720 
730 
740 
750 
650 
560 
450 
385 
300 
490 
545 
600 
650 
700 
750 
650 
560 
450 
385 
300 
No limit 445 
455 
480 
505 
530 
560 
570 
630 
635 
580 
540 
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In Case Ha there was no limit on annual imports. Instead, total imports (over the 
model time horizon) were restricted to 35 TWyr. For comparison, full utilization of the 
import possibilities in the IIASA scenarios would result in the following levels: for Cases 
C and N, 33.2 TWyr; for Case H, 30.4 TWyr; for Case L, 29.7 TWyr. The actual results for 
total oil imports are shown in Table A.7. 
TABLE A.7 Total oil imports in the 
scenarios, 1980-2030 (TWyr). 
Total oil imports (TWyr) 
Case H 
Case L 
Case C 
Case N 
Case Ha 
25.5 
24 
27 
27 
35 
TABLE A.8 Gas usage in the scenarios. 
Case H 
Case L 
Case C 
Case N 
Case Ha 
12 
8 
12 
12 
6.1 
Category I (TWyr) Category II (TWyr) Category HI (TWyr) 
2.6 0 
0 0 
2.6 0 
2.6 0 
2.0 0 
1.1.3 Gas 
Total availability: Cases H, L, C, and N 
Category I ($62/kWyr): 12.0 TWyr 
Category II ($103/kWyr): 3.0 TWyr 
Category III ($129/kWyr): 9.0 TWyr 
Total availability: Case Ha 
Category I ($43/kWyr): 6.1 TWyr 
Category II ($75/kWyr): 8.5 TWyr 
The actual usages in the scenarios are as given in Table A.8. 
The maximum annual extractions of gas for aü indigenous categories together are 
given in Table A.9. 
The maximum annual gas imports are shown in Table A. 10. 
1.1.4 Natural uranium 
Total availability: Cases H, L, C, and N 
Category I ($80/kgU = $30/lb U3Og): 460 kt* 
Category II ($130/kgU = $50/lb U 30 8 ) : 1.2 Mt 
Total availability: Case Ha 
Category I ($80/kgU = $30Ab U3Og): 250 kt 
Category II ($130/kg U = $50/lb U3Og): 350 kt 
*kgU, kilograms of uranium;kt, kilotons; Mt, megatons (106 tons). 
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TABLE A.9 Maximum annual gas extraction in the scenarios for all indigenous 
categories together. 
Year Cases H, C, and Ν (GWyr) Case L (GWyr) Case IIa (GWyr) 
1980 
1985 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2005 
2010 
2015 
2020 
2025 
2030 
250 
255 
260 
265 
270 
270 
270 
270 
270 
270 
270 
220 
200 
190 
175 
165 
155 
140 
120 
100 
75 
50 
200 
192 
181 
169 
160 
150 
140 
130 
120 
100 
80 
TABLE A. 10 Maximum annual gas imports in the scenarios. 
Year Cases H, L, C, and Ν (GWyr) Case Ha (GWyr) 
1980 
1985 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2005 
2010 
2015 
2020 
2025 
2030 
No limits 200 
215 
240 
280 
325 
370 
410 
440 
440 
440 
440 
Costs: Cases H, L, C, and N: $66/kWyr (1980), gradually in­
creasing to $119/kWyr (2010) and constant thereafter. Case Ha: 
$47/kWyr (1980), gradually increasing to $100/kWyr (2030). 
TABLE A.ll Uranium usage in the scenarios. 
Category I (kilotons) Category II (kilotons) 
Case Η 460 
Case L 460 
Case C 460 
Case Ν Low 460 
Case IIa 250 
810 
163 
615 
566 
90 
Actual usage in the scenarios is as given in Table A.l 1. 
The maximum annual extraction for all indigenous categories together is as given in 
Table A. 12. 
No limits are imposed in Case Ha on annual imports of natural uranium. However, 
total imports in this case are limited to 2 Mt, at costs of $83/kgU (1980), gradually in­
creasing to $174/kgU (2030), 1.13 Mt of which are used. 
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TABLE A.l 2 Maximum annual uranium extraction in the scenar-
ios for all indigenous categories together. 
Year Cases H, L, C, and N (kilotons) Case IIa (kilotons) 
1980 No limits 4.8 
1985 6.5 
1990 7.0 
1995 8.5 
2000 10.0 
2005 11.0 
2010 10.0 
2015 8.0 
2020 6.0 
2025 4.5 
2030 3.5 
TABLE A.l 3 Hydroelectric power capacity in the scenarios. 
Cases H, L, C, and N Case Ha 
Capacity (1975) (gigawatts) 43 29 
Asymptote (gigawatts) 42.5 45 
Capacity factor 0.5 0.5 
No imports are taken into account in the other scenarios. This is more a technical 
question than a reflection of reality. The main text describes how the assumptions in 
these scenarios with respect to natural uranium should be interpreted. 
1.1.5 Thorium 
The H, L, C, and N scenarios do not consider high temperature reactors; the only 
case in which thorium is consumed is Case Ha. Even in this case thorium does not play a 
significant role. 
1.1.6 Hydroelectric power 
The actual electrical energy generated by hydroelectric power in 1975 was 14.5 
GWyr; the installed capacity was 43 GW (see Table A. 13). This means that Cases H, L, 
N, and C assume the right capacity whereas Case Ha assumes the right amount of energy 
produced from hydro power. Although they do not influence the solutions significantly, 
these discrepancies represent mistakes that were overlooked. 
1.1.7 Nuclear power 
Only Cases H, L, C, and N have constraints on total nuclear capacity. These are as 
shown in Table A.14. 
These constraints reflect a limitation on the total annual addition to nuclear capacity. 
This means that the maximum capacity at a given time can only be attained if the maxi-
mum capacity additions are made in all time periods up to this point. 
1980 
1985 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2005 
2010 
2015 
2020 
2025 
2030 
29 
48 
77 
120 
182 
262 
372 
500 
652 
726 
803 
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TABLE A.14 Constraints on the growth of total 
nuclear capacity in the scenarios. 
Year Cases H,C, and Ν (GW) Case L(GW) 
23 
31 
46 
68 
100 
141 
212 
302 
424 
510 
530 
No limit on total nuclear capacity was imposed on the model for Case IIa. In this 
case the build­up of nuclear capacity was constrained only by the market penetration 
constraints and by the date of introduction of new nuclear technologies. These constraints 
have the following form: 
y^yy'­1 +g 
where yf is the annual increment of capacity in time period t,yis the growth parameter, 
and g is the parameter that permits the starting­up of a technology. If capacity were to be 
increased to the limits of the constraints, after three to four time periods the total increase 
would generally be more than could be utilized. The constraints therefore limit the rate of 
build­up rather than the total capacity. For this reason, they were also employed in cases 
H, L, C, and N, in addition to the limits on total capacity. 
TABLE A.15 Input data for nuclear power in the scenarios. 
Cases H,L,C,N 
Light water reactor 
Fast breeder reactor 
High temperature reactor 
Case Ha 
Light water reactor 
Fast breeder reactor 
High temperature reactor 
n.a.: not applicable. 
7 
1.5 
2 
n.a. 
2 
2 
2 
g 
1 
1 
n.a. 
1 
1 
6 
Start­up date 
No constraint 
2000 
n.a. 
No constraint 
2000 
2005 
The input data are as shown in Table A.l 5. 
As an indication of the extent to which the constraints were effected, the actual 
nuclear capacities in all cases for 2030 are given in Table A.16. 
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TABLE A.16 Nuclear capacity in the year 2030 in the scenarios. 
Case H 
Case C 
Case N 
Case IIa 
Case L 
Light water reactor 
(GWe)" 
222 
283 
129 
30 
89 
Fast breeder reactor 
(GWe) 
497 
0 
404 
345 
357 
High temperature reactor 
(GWe) 
_ 
-
-
78 
-
Total 
(GWe) 
719 
283 
533 
453 
446 
"GWe: gigawatts electric (10' watts). 
TABLE A. 17 Data on electricity generation. 
Light water reactor 
Cases H,L,N 
Case C 
Case Ha 
Fast breeder reactor 
Cases H,L,N 
Case C 
Case IIa 
Coal 
Cases H,L,C,N 
Case Ha 
Advanced coalc 
Cases H,L,C,N 
Case Ha 
Hydro power 
Cases H,L,C,N 
Case Ha 
STECd 
Cases H,L,C,N 
Case IIa 
Oil-fired power plant 
Cases H,L,C,N 
Case Ha 
Gas-fired power plant 
Cases H,L,C,N 
Case IIa 
Gas turbines 
Cases H,L,C,N 
Case IIa 
Capital costs 
(S/kW)«· 
700 
1400 
525 
920 
1850 
940 
550 
460 
480 
400 
620 
520 
1900 
1900 
350 
310 
325 
300 
170 
220 
Running costs 
($/kWyr)¡> 
50 
50 
42 
50 
50 
41 
23 
19 
36 
30 
8.5 
7.0 
60 
60 
19 
16 
16 
13 
17 
13 
Maximum availability 
(fraction) 
0.7 
0.7 
0.7 
0.7 
0.7 
0.7 
0.7 
0.7 
0.7 
0.7 
0.5 
0.5 
0.57 
0.57 
0.7 
0.7 
0.7 
0.7 
0.7 
0.7 
Product cost 
WkWyr) 
136 
207 
111 
143 
237 
136 
171 
163 
167 
158 
85 
81 
297 
297 
247 
191 
216 
160 
241 
180 
aUS(1975) dollars per kilowatt. 
bUS(1975) dollars per kilowatt-year. 
cAdvanced coal means a cheaper (in terms of capital costs), more efficient, and cleaner technology, e.g. 
fluidi2ed bed combustion. 
d STEC includes some storage (plant factor up to 57%) and extra transmission costs (expressed as high 
running costs). 
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1.2 Data on Technologies 
The costs of technologies, their maximum availability (as an average percentage of 
time), and a product price that is the result of a simple static cost calculation made by 
using an annuity factor to arrive at levelized capital costs, are described in the following. 
Other simplifying assumptions had to be made to arrive at a single figure for product costs. 
These are firstly that capacity is fully utilized, and, secondly, that the fuel costs are given 
by the figure for cost category I of the relevant fuel input. The resulting product costs 
can provide a yardstick for the preference ranking done by the linear programming model, 
which depends also on a dynamic relation within the model. In addition, it should be 
kept in mind that the tight constraints on resource availability usually mean that the area 
within which the cost data determine the optimal solution is rather small. The cost figures 
should therefore be regarded more as a technical means of expressing the preference rank­
ing of the technologies than as actual costs. 
1.2.1 Electricity generation 
See Table A.l7. 
1.2.2 Other technologies 
See Table A.l8. 
TABLE A.l8 Data on other technologies. 
Capital costs Running costs Maximum availability Product cost 
($/kW)° ($/kWyr)¡> (fraction) ($/kWyr) 
73 
135 
122 
135 
122 
75 
5J 
Note: The high temperature reactor of the design used for Case IIa produces electricity as a side pro­
duct. The cost of its main output (gas) was reduced by an amount representing the value of the elec­
tricity. 
aUS(1975) dollars per kilowatt thermal energy content of product output. 
bUS(1975) dollars per kilowatt­year thermal energy content of product output. 
High temperature reactor 
gasification 
Cases H,L,C,N 
Case Ha 
Autothermal coal 
gasification 
Cases H,L,C,N 
Case Ha 
Autothermal coal 
liquefaction 
Cases H,L,C,N 
Case Ha 
Crude oil refinery 
Cases H,L,C,N 
Case Ha 
­
550 
480 
400 
480 
400 
50 
43 
­
19.4 
40 
30 
40 
30 
3.7 
3.1 
­
0.85 
0.85 
0 85 
0.85 
0.85 
0.85 
0.85 
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